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PREFACE
As established in its Basic Constitutional Act, the Central Bank of Chile must 
“safeguard the stability of the currency and the normal operation of internal and 
external payments.” To carry out these tasks, the Central Bank of Chile is vested 
with diverse legal powers, such as extending emergency credit and determining 
regulations in matters affecting the financial system and international trade 
operations.
The Central Bank’s focus in the area of financial stability is centered mainly on 
the proper functioning of the system and the Chilean economy’s access to the 
international financial markets. The Central Bank’s tracking of financial stability 
is complementary to that undertaken by the specialized supervisory entities; it 
serves as an independent element of analysis with respect to the supervisors’ 
powers and functions in relation to the entities subject to their oversight.
The objective of the Financial Stability Report is to provide information, on 
a half-yearly basis, on recent macroeconomic and financial events that could 
affect the financial stability of the Chilean economy, such as the evolution 
of the indebtedness of the main credit users, the performance of the capital 
market, and the ability of the financial system and the international financial 
position to adapt sufficiently to adverse economic situations. In addition, the 
Report presents the policies and measures that support the normal operation 
of the internal and external payment system, with the objective of promoting 
general knowledge and public debate with regard to the Bank’s performance 
in fulfilling this function.
The Board7
SUMMARY
The risks coming from the United States and the Eurozone described 
in previous Financial Stability Reports have decreased, so the focus 
has been turned to the Chinese economy as the main source of 
external risk. In the U.S. the withdrawal of unconventional monetary stimulus 
has been in line with expectations, while the Eurozone has made progress 
in the field of fiscal and banking institutions. In contrast, China continues to 
decelerate and doubts persist about the soundness of its financial system.
The materialization of external risks could have consequences for 
Chile considering the slowdown in the domestic economy. Importantly, 
a sharper deceleration in China would have a significant impact because of 
its effects on external demand and the price of copper. Risks in the U.S. and 
the Eurozone could trigger episodes of financial turbulence; in particular, a 
change in the expectations about the timing and speed the U.S. will define 
for normalization of its monetary policy rate or if new developments in the 
Eurozone’s banking sector fail to meet the markets’ expectations.
Domestically,  the  financial  situation  of  companies  has  lost  some 
strength in recent quarters. On one hand, corporate borrowing has increased 
as a percentage of GDP. On the other, firms reporting to the Superintendence 
of Securities and Insurance (SVS) maintain relatively high levels of debt by 
historical standards and profits continue to be revised downward. Although 
these trends are consistent with those of companies in other economies, they 
are indicative of reduced resilience in the sector to any abrupt adjustments 
in the dynamics of the economy. Finally, in the last year non-performing loan 
indicators for commercial banks have deteriorated for firms in sectors more 
exposed to the overall business cycle.
The housing market shows the same dynamic described in previous 
Reports. Sales of new homes remain high and inventories low. In this context, 
several indicators show that housing prices continued to rise in 2013. While 
the upward trend is present across geographical areas, the largest increases 
continue to concentrate in just a few. On the other hand, in the commercial 
real estate sector the vacancy rate for office space increased, and is expected 
to increase further with the entry of new projects to the market. Thus, it is 
important that the relevant agents take into account in their investment and 
financing decisions that future prices might evolve away from recent trends.8
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Risks associated with household debt remain stable. Total household 
debt rose slightly in the last quarter of 2013. In banking debt, there continues to 
be a change in composition toward middle- and upper-income households, with 
stronger growth in credit volume than in number of debtors. Non-performing 
loan indicators for bank and non-bank lenders show no major movements. This 
may be due to the compositional changes in consumer portfolios as well as to 
the lower effect on the labor market of the cyclical position of the economy.
Banks have gradually been reducing commercial credit growth and, 
to a lesser extent, the consumer lending in response to the slowing 
economy. There has also been a reduction in the exposure to those sectors 
most affected by the cycle. This has been reflected in stable levels of 
aggregate delinquency, for both segments.
Banks’ profitability increased marginally in recent quarters, while their capital 
adequacy ratio remain stable. The stress tests show that the banking 
system still has sufficient capital to accommodate a severely stressful 
scenario. However, this would have somewhat effects in profitability than was 
obtained in earlier Reports.
The less favorable phase of the cycle the economy is experiencing 
could involve credit risk increases. On one hand, households with greater 
exposure to the cycle could worsen their payment behavior should the labor 
market weaken significantly. On the other side, the deterioration seen during 
the last year in some economic sectors of the commercial loan portfolio could 
worsen if faced with a more pronounced slowdown. Thus, the level of provisions 
made in each case is an important element to mitigate the impact of these risks.
Funding costs are low, with long-term real interest rates around their 10-
year lows. Still, a reversal cannot be ruled out, nor can new episodes 
of volatility. Accordingly, it is still important to have diversified sources and 
maturities of external and domestic credit. A large part of the banking industry 
has moved in that direction, but some smaller banks continue to depend 
substantially on local wholesale funding sources.
Finally, the Chilean economy is in a phase of slowing output and 
demand, which affects income growth of households and firms. The 
growth forecast for this year lies between 2.5 and 3.5%. The combination of 
somewhat lower GDP growth and possible episodes of volatility in the financial 
markets  requires  agents  to  properly  assess  their  borrowing  and  lending 
decisions.9
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I. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT AND FINANCIAL 
RISKS
FIGURE I.1
Financing needs and costs in 2014 (*) 
(percent, percent of GDP)
FIGURE I.2
Profitability of the European banking system (*) 
(percent of total assets)
(*) Financing needs include maturing debt and the expected fiscal 
deficit for the year.
Sources: Bloomberg and FMI.
(*) For Spain, includes Santander, BBVA, Sabadell, Bankinter, 
Caixabank,  Popular.  Italy:  Popolare,  Monte  Dei  Pasce,  Unicredit, 
Ubi banca, Intesa San Paolo. Portugal: Espirito Santo, BPI. Greece: 
Hellenic Post, Piraeus, National Bank of Greece, Alpha, Agricultural. 
Germany: AAreal Bank, Deutsche, Dab, Commerzbank. France: BNP 
Paribas, Credit Agricole, Société Générale.
Source: Bloomberg.
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Since the last Financial Stability Report, external financial conditions have 
improved within a context of lower volatility. However, the risks described 
in  previous  Reports  are  still  present,  and  their  materialization  could  have 
significant  effects,  especially  considering  that  Chile  faces  a  process  of  an 
economic slowdown.
EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION
The  Eurozone  has  made  progress  in  the  fiscal  area  and  in  the 
institutional structure of the banking industry.
In the fiscal area, both sovereign debt and public sector financing needs have 
stabilized, although they are still high, especially in the peripheral economies. In 
addition, the cost of public financing has generally dropped (figure I.1). In fact, 
Portugal returned to the debt markets for the first time since its rescue in 2011, 
with a bond issue that was met with strong demand.
The  financial  system  has  also  improved. The  average  capitalization  of  the 
banking sector increased, which is consistent with the recovery of indicators 
such as profitability in several of the countries in the Eurozone (figure I.2). A 
key development in this arena has been the willingness of their authorities to 
forge agreements on a Single Supervisory Mechanism for the region’s banks. 
This is one of the three fundamental pillars to fulfill the so-called Banking 
Union (chapter V). It is necessary to keep advancing whit the Single Resolution 
Mechanism and remain to be addressed a Common Deposit Insurance system, 
which would provide the basis for limiting contagion between sovereign and 
banking risk.
These advances have been facilitated by economic growth, albeit at low rates. 
However, challenges remain for most of the countries in the region, especially in 
a context of low competitiveness (given the scarce improvement in productivity), 
high unemployment and real appreciation of the euro. Low inflation figures 
have given rise to discussions on the need to implement quantitative stimulus 
programs, and in June the monetary policy rate was cut to a new historical low 
(figure I.3).10
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FIGURE I.3
Europe: Inflation and real exchange rate
(annual percent change, fixed-base index: 99.I = 100)
FIGURE I.4
Portfolio flows to emerging economies (*)
(US$ billion)
(*) Real exchange rate based on unit labor costs. A positive change 
indicates an appreciation of the euro.
Sources: Bloomberg and European Central Bank.
(*) Flows accumulated since January 2007. Sample of investment fund 
portfolio flows to emerging Asia, emerging Europe and Latin America. 
The first vertical line marks the sell-off event in May 2013 and the 
second the last Financial Stability Report. The last datum (May 2014) is 
a forecast based on flows through the 26th of that month.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on information from the 
Emerging Portfolio Fund Research.
FIGURE I.5
Gross capital inflows to Chile (1)
(percent of GDP)
(1) Annual accumulated flow of external liabilities, moving quarter.
(2) Includes loans, commercial credits, currency and deposits.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
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In the United States, the withdrawal of the unconventional monetary 
stimulus has proceeded as expected, in a context of reduced tension 
in the financial markets.
In December 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced that it would 
begin to scale back its unconventional monetary stimulus program in January 
2014. The withdrawal has proceeded on time and at a rate in line with market 
expectations. As a result, the international financial markets are calmer than in 
May 2013, when the Fed first signaled that it was considering cutting back its 
asset purchase program. 
While volatility did increase in January of this year, the withdrawal of the 
monetary stimulus could not be identified as the main driver. Other contributing 
factors  came  from  the  emerging  economies  themselves,  where  sources  of 
vulnerability have built up in the recent past. 
In  the  last  few  months,  the  calmer  international  markets  have 
coincided  with  an  easing  of  portfolio  outflows  from  emerging 
economies.
The exodus of portfolio capital in 2013 was especially marked in some of the 
larger emerging economies, such as Brazil, Russia and China, in both fixed 
and variable income. This trend was marginally reversed, however, in the first 
quarter of 2014 (figure I.4).
In  Chile,  portfolio  inflows  have  slowed  since  the  last  Financial 
Stability Report, mainly in variable income.
Domestically, the fixed-income portfolio has been stable at 2.6% of GDP since 
the last Report (27% of total liabilities), in line with the dynamic overseas bond 
issues by the corporate and banking sectors (chapters III and IV). The variable-
income portfolio has contracted relative to the last Report, falling from 2.2 to 
1.2% of GDP in the first quarter of 2014.
Gross capital inflows to Chile have fallen since the last Report, hitting 9.7% 
of GDP in the first quarter of 2014—its lowest level since late 2009. Foreign 
direct investment (FDI), in particular, fell from 8.6% of GDP in the third quarter 
of 2013 to 6.5% of GDP in the first quarter of this year, although it continues 
to lead the composition of inflows. The drop reflects a less dynamic trend in FDI-
related debt instruments and, most recently, a reduction in capital contributions. 
External liability flows from credits and loans fell to –0.6% of GDP, due to 
increased amortization of these obligations (figure I.5).11
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT  FIRST HALF 2014
FIGURE I.7
Residual short-term external debt, by institutional 
sector (1)
(percent of GDP)
FIGURE I.6
Net international investment position of Chile (1) 
(percent of GDP)
(1) GDP at constant real exchange rate (fixed-base index: March 
2014=100). 
(2)  Other  sectors  are  comprised  almost  entirely  of  nonfinancial 
corporations  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  nonbank  financial  firms, 
households and nonprofit institutions.
(3) FDI loans between related firms.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
(1)  GDP  at  constant  real  exchange  rate  (fixed-base  index:  March 
2014=100).
(2) Central government and municipalities.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
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Solvency  indicators  have  not  changed  significantly,  while  the 
availability of external liquidity increased at the margin.
The net international investment position (NIIP) remains around the average of 
the last two years. Part of the increase in the net debit position of banks and 
corporations has been offset in some measure by the strengthening of the net 
credit position of the institutional sector and the central government (figure I.6). 
This position compares favorably with other emerging economies, as does the 
economy’s external liquidity (box I.1).
The residual short-term external debt remains around 14% of GDP, with a 
smaller share of the corporate sector (figure I.7).
MAIN EXTERNAL THREATS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
Most of the trends described in the last Financial Stability Report have been 
consolidated at the global level. Thus, the external risk scenario for the Chilean 
financial system is similar to what it was six months ago, although the risk 
factors have been reclassified in terms of their probability of occurrence.
The focal point of risk is the performance of China and developments 
in its financial market.
The growth outlook for China has declined in the last year. In principle, this 
is seen as somewhat positive given that the country’s authorities are aiming 
to achieve more sustainable growth in the medium term. However, growth 
could fall more than expected. This is increasingly probable based on the risks 
emerging in the financial system, in particular the strong growth of nonbank 
credit, the quality of the intermediaries of this financing and their high degree 
of interrelation with the formal banking system. 
In the event of that faster slowdown, the emerging world, including Chile, 
would  be  affected  through  both  the  real  and  financial  channels. The  real 
channel would operate through a reduction in external demand and, mainly, 
the negative impact on commodities prices, in particular copper1/. 
The potential impact of the financial channel is less precise, as there are no 
prior events to provide a comparison. One hypothesis is that a financial crisis in 
China could trigger greater risk aversion among international investors about 
other  emerging  economies,  causing  an  increase  in  sovereign  spreads  and 
capital outflows. In addition, a change in China’s reserve accumulation policy, 
in response to lower liquidity in the financial system or greater openness of the 
financial account, could lead to higher interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds2/.
1/ For more information, see the Monetary Policy Report, March 2014, box I.1.
2/ The IMF (2011) estimates an increase in 10-year bond rates of 5 to 12 basis points for each US$100 
billion in sales of these assets.12
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
FIGURE I.8
Direct cross-border loans to China and countries with 
strong trade ties to China (*)
(data for 2013, percent of Tier 1 capital)
(*) Countries with extensive exports to China: Malaysia, Singapore, 
South Korea and South Africa. 
Sources: BIS (ultimate risk basis), IMF (FSI) and Bloomberg.
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China direct Strong trade ties to China
Finally, there could be some degree of contagion to foreign banks and global 
fund managers that have a significant stock exposure—relative to their core 
capital and total assets managed—to Chinese banks and/or credit exposure 
through direct cross-border loans to China and to economies whose exports 
depend on China (figure I.8).
There could be some short-term volatility events associated with the 
timing and speed of the normalization of the Fed funds rate, but the 
risks are concentrated in the medium term. 
The  uncertainty  surrounding  the  recovery  of  the  U.S.  economy  and  the 
normalization of its conventional monetary policy has diminished in recent 
months. Thus, market expectations point to gradual increases in the Fed funds 
rate starting in mid-2015. However, the possibility of an earlier rise cannot 
be discarded, which implies a risk of new episodes of volatility. Key factors 
for the outcome in this area include the official communication from the Fed 
and  the  evolution  of  the  U.S.  economy.  Beyond  these  considerations,  the 
commencement of the rate hike within the expected horizon carries risks for 
the emerging economies, which will depend on the response capacity of each 
economy. The emerging countries, in general, have more solid institutional 
framework and fundamentals than in previous cases of rate hikes by the Fed, 
although some have built up vulnerabilities in the most recent period (box I.1).
In the Eurozone, the scenario is fragile despite improvements, and 
the risks are mainly associated with the financial system. 
The new stress tests could uncover weaknesses in the banks’ default portfolios, 
asset valuation and capitalization, which would worsen the financial health 
diagnosis. At the same time, establishing the Banking Union requires important 
political agreements, and if these are not reached with the speed and depth 
expected by the market, it could generate volatility and delay the economic 
recovery  now  underway.  To  some  degree,  these  doubts  could  undermine 
investors’ appetite for risk and increase risk spreads and external financing 
costs at the global level. 13
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BOX I.1
NORMALIZATION OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND 
DIFFERENTIATION AMONG EMERGING ECONOMIES  
1/ In 1999, the Fed also implemented a contractionary monetary policy in response to 
the Asian crisis, which caused economies to react worldwide. This event led to foreign 
capital outflows from the EMEs, as well as a series of changes in the policy framework 
of many economies, such as the implementation of a flexible exchange rate regime and 
the adoption of inflation targeting.
FIGURE I.9
Fed funds rate hikes (*)
(percent, basis point)
(*) The EMBI+ is an expansion of the EMBI that, in addition to Brady bonds 
denominated in U.S. dollars and other currencies, includes loans, Eurobonds and local 
market instruments.
Source: Bloomberg.
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2/ See Contreras et al. (2012), González and Levy (2006) and Longstaff et al. (2011) 
on the role of global versus idiosyncratic factors as determinants of capital flows and 
sovereign spreads. 
3/ See Yellen (2013) on the evolution of the Fed’s communication strategy over time, 
with a shift toward “forward guidance” since 2000; and BIS (2014) on the different 
communication used in the two events.
4/ As described in chapter I of this Report, the volatility events observed in the most 
recent period have been associated with idiosyncratic factors and have had a larger 
impact on economies that are more open financially and that have less policy space 
(IMF, 2014a; IMF, 2014c).
The aftermath of the Great Recession in the United States was 
marked by low interest rates and massive asset purchases by 
the U.S. Federal Reserve (the Fed), with strong capital inflows 
to emerging market economies (EMEs). At the same time, risk 
spreads contacted beyond what was indicated by macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Hartelius et al., 2008).
In a context of monetary policy normalization in the United 
States, macroeconomic fundamentals could become relatively 
more important, as seen in the most recent period (IMF, 2014a). 
This box summarizes the economic situation of the EMEs leading 
up to other rate hike cycles in the federal funds rate (FFR), in 
order to provide a point of reference for the current situation of 
this group of economies in general and Chile in particular.
FFR hikes: 1994 and 2004
The FFR hike cycles that commenced in 1994 and 2004 had 
different results in terms of the increase in long-term rates and 
the sovereign risk of EMEs1/ (figure I.9). This was due, in part, 
to the relative strength of the macroeconomic environment in 
which the episodes occurred (Filardo and Hofmann, 2014). In 
1994, the reversal of capital flows from the EMEs took place in 
a context of fixed exchange rate regimes and limited financial 
openness,  which  caused  a  sharp  deterioration  in  financial 
conditions (IMF, 2013a). In contrast, in 2004 the EMEs were 
characterized by greater financial openness and high levels of 
capital inflows (BIS, 2014; IMF, 2013a). Moreover, world growth 
was more solid in the 2004–06 period, which reinforced the 
bonanza of capital inflows.
The Fed’s communication about the rate increases was also 
different in the two episodes2/ In 1994, the rate hike surprised 
the market, whereas in 2004 the process was more transparent 
and announced in advance3/. Recent events show that emerging 
financial markets are still sensitive to news from the Fed, but 
to the extent that communication improves, idiosyncratic factors 
become more important4/.
Macroeconomic conditions in the EMEs before a FFR 
hike
The conditions under which the EMEs faced the FFR hikes were 
also more favorable in 2004 than in 1994, especially in terms of 14
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FIGURE I.11
Solvency and liquidity indicators (1) (2)
(percent of GDP, times)
(1) Solvency: net international investment position as a percent of GDP. Liquidity: ratio 
of available resources (sum of international reserves and sovereign funds) to financing 
needs (sum of the deficit portion of the current account that is not financed by FDI 
liabilities and the short-term external debt).
(2) Data for the second quarter of 2013, or last data available. Dotted lines indicate 
the median of each indicator for the sample of selected EMEs (blue) and small open 
developed economies (green).
Sources: Central Bank of Chile, BIS, Bloomberg, IMF and central bank web pages.
FIGURE I.10
Macroeconomic conditions in EMEs prior to stress events (1) 
(percent)
(1) The sample used for inflation statistics, public debt and the current account balance 
includes the following: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
South Korea, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela. Due to 
unavailability capital flow data, the sample for the lower right panel does not include 
Egypt and Malaysia for any year, Ecuador for 1993 and 2003, and China, Colombia, 
Panama, Russia and Venezuela for 1993.
(2) Cumulative data as of the second quarter of 2013.
Sources: ECLAC, Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) and IMF (2014c).
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5/ See Financial Stability Report, first half 2013, box I.1.
macroeconomic stability. By 2004, most of the economies had 
adopted inflation-targeting regimes, and public debt was lower, 
on average, and more evenly distributed among the economies 
(figure I.10). Finally, the current account balance was positive for 
the majority of the countries, while the composition of external 
financing was dominated by a higher share of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) before the 2004 cycle than in 1994.
Current macroeconomic conditions are similar to the period 
leading up to the 2004 FFR hike, with the exception of the current 
account balance, which is in deficit on average. Inflation is lower, 
public debt is slightly lower (but with a wider dispersion), and FDI 
accounts for a larger share of liabilities. The latter is especially 
relevant since this component tends to be less volatile5/.
Chile compares favorably with other emerging economies on 
inflation, public debt and the FDI share of external liabilities. 
Additionally, Chile’s external liquidity for financing short-term 
commitments is currently near the average for EMEs and in the 
upper end of the group of small open developed economies with 
a similar macroeconomic regime. It is also in the upper end in 
both groups of countries in terms of solvency (figure I.11). This 
reflects the low level of public debt and the strong net credit 
position of Chilean institutional investors, which practically 
offsets the net debit position of the corporate and banking 
sectors. Chile’s better relative position is reflected in its risk 
assessment at the international level, with better credit ratings 
and lower spreads than other emerging economies.15
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II. LOCAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
FIGURE II.1
Money market in pesos (*) 
(monthly moving average, basis points)
FIGURE II.2
Prime rates and average interbank swap rates (spc)
(percent)
(*) Average interbank prime-swap spread. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
Sources: Central Bank of Chile and Bloomberg.
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The capital markets have been characterized by the low cost of financing, both 
short and long term. Sovereign rates continue to show a low degree of co-
movement with their external benchmarks.
MONEY MARKET
Financing conditions in the money market have improved, with 
significant reductions in interest rates and spreads. 
Since the last Financial Stability Report, the difference between prime deposit 
rates and swap contracts (the prime-swap spread) at different maturities 
fell around 40 basis points (bp) on average. In early May, the 90-day spread 
was fluctuating around zero, for the first time since the local unconventional 
stimulus measures (FLAP) were in effect in 2010 (figure II.1). This suggests that 
financing conditions have eased for the banking system. As a result of the lower 
spreads and a reduction in the monetary policy rate (MPR) of 75bp since the 
close of the last Report, financing costs in the money market are around 4%, 
the lowest level since mid-2010 (figure II.2).
The lower spreads could be explained, to a large extent, by the greater 
investments in time deposits made by institutional investors thus far in the year. 
In particular, the pension funds invested around US$4.5 billion in time-deposits 
in 2014 to date, equivalent to 37% of their stock of time deposits at the start 
of the year (figure II.3). Even though the pension funds’ investments in time 
deposits continue to be influenced by the massive switching between funds by 
their affiliates, most of these investments reflect active management decisions. 
These decisions are part of a strategy of taking less risky positions, which 
has also led to a reduction in exposure to variable-rate instruments overseas. 
The increase in time-deposit investments is also consistent with a strategy of 
obtaining capital gains in a period characterized by reductions in local short-
term rates.16
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FIGURE II.3
Fixed-income  portfolio  management  and  financial 
intermediation of institutional investors (*)
(change in stock, US$ million)
FIGURE II.5
Interest rate on long-term sovereign bonds (*)
(percent)
FIGURE II.4
Mutual fund fixed-income assets  
(US$ million)
(*) Data available through 23 May 2014. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the Central 
Securities Depository.
(*) Average monthly rates.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
(1) Investment in debt with a maturity of 90 days or less.
(2) Investment in debt with a maturity of 365 days or less.
(3) Investment in medium- and long-term debt.
Source: SVS.
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The mutual funds have also increased substantially their investments in time-
deposits. Thus far in the year, they have invested around US$2 billion in these 
instruments—equivalent to 8% of their time-deposits stock at the start of the 
year. These investments largely correspond to new flows under management, 
which have primarily been allocated to funds that are concentrated in debt 
instruments, in particular medium- and long-term Type 3 funds (MF3) (figure II.4).
The better financing conditions could also reflect the notable issuance of fixed-
income instruments by some banks, which has given the banking system an 
additional source of liquidity.
All in all, there is always the possibility that sudden changes in the portfolio 
composition of the institutional investors, in response to relative asset returns 
and/or changes in the perception of local or external risk, could generate 
significant reversals in the spreads, as has occurred in the past.
FIXED-INCOME MARKET 
Long-term sovereign interest rates continued to decrease since the 
last Report. 
Since the close of the last Report, the rates on peso-denominated instruments 
have declined 10bp, on average, while UF-denominated rates have dropped 
around 45bp. This reduction is in addition to the decrease recorded in the 
second half of 2013. As a result, the rates on nominal and inflation-indexed 
instruments at some maturities are at their lowest level of the last decade 
(figure II.5).
Local factors—associated with a fall in the supply of sovereign bonds, greater 
demand by the institutional investors and a lower economic growth outlook— 
could be behind the lower rates since the last Report. In particular, mutual funds 
concentrated in medium- and long-term debt (FM3) have recorded a significant 
increase in assets under management since the last Report. As mentioned, this 
increase mainly derives from new contributions and, to a lesser extent, the 
reallocation of resources in variable-income funds.
The steady decline in local rates since last year is especially noteworthy 
considering that the external benchmarks have increased since the second half 
of 2013, with a slight reduction in the most recent period. Estimates of the 
domestic ten-year rate in pesos, based on uncovered interest rate parity models, 
suggest that it should have behaved more in line with external benchmark rates 
in recent quarters (figure II.6).17
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FIGURE II.6
Estimated long-term sovereign rate (*)
(percent)
FIGURE II.7
Financing costs for firms (*)
(percent)
(*) Estimates based on the uncovered parity model. Slashed lines 
indicate 5% and 10% confidence intervals.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
(*) Private issues of UF-denominated bonds with a AA rating and a 
maturity of around five years. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the Santiago 
Stock Exchange.
FIGURE II.8
Domestic bond issues (*)
(Ch$ billion accumulated in 12 months)
(*) At May 2014 prices.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the Santiago 
Stock Exchange and the media.
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As discussed in the last Financial Stability Report, while there is a lot of 
uncertainty regarding the determinant factors behind these differences, 
idiosyncratic elements could be part of the explanation. These include frictions 
in the local debt market, the relatively small size of the sovereign fixed-income 
market and its limited integration, with a low share of non-resident investors. 
Local rates could adjust in the future, however, as the global depositary note 
(GDN) program and the implementation of the new Single Funds Act could 
achieve a higher degree of integration between local and international debt 
markets in the long run.
In the national corporate market, lower spreads have contributed to 
improving financing conditions.
The financing conditions for firms began to improve steadily in mid-2013, and 
the trend has continued thus far in 2014 (figure II.7). Since the last Report, the 
corporate bond spread has decreased by around 30bp, on average. Combined with 
the lower long-term sovereign rates, this implies better private debt conditions, 
with average costs falling on the order of 86bp. As a result, the climate has been 
favorable for the issuance of bonds on the local market (figure II.8).
While this reduction in financing costs is a positive development, if local rates 
remain low over the coming months, there could be losses deriving from the 
rescue of private bonds and the prepayment of mortgage instruments. The 
latter, in particular, would affect the value of assets held by banks and life 
insurance companies. Low interest rates could also motivate investors to seek 
out relatively riskier assets. 
STOCK AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS
The better performance of developed countries vis-à-vis emerging 
economies in the recent period has had an impact on stock and 
currency prices.
The local stock exchange, measured through the IPSA index, fell in January but 
has since recovered, posting a cumulative increase of 7% measured in pesos 
as of the closing date of this Report (table II.1). In terms of volatility, the IPSA 
has followed a similar trend to other emerging stock markets since the start of 
the year. Thus far in the second quarter of 2014, volatility has been somewhat 
lower than in the second half of 2013 (figure II.9).18
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FIGURE II.9
Stock index volatility in emerging economies (*)
(annualized percent, local currency)
FIGURE II.10
Benchmark parities
(index: January 2013 = 100)
(*) Average monthly volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the daily 
variation in the stock index in 20-day moving period. The sample includes Chile, 
Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, South Africa, South Korea, China, India, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Hungary, Poland, Czech Rep. and Turkey.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Bloomberg.
(1) Includes Colombia, Peru, Mexico and Brazil.
(2) Includes Norway, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
Source: Bloomberg.
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Countries 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Since the last 
Report
IPSA 10.5 -20.3 -4.8 -8.0 7.0 1.2
Latam (2) -7.4 -20.5 -3.9 -11.7 4.1 -0.7
Commodity exporters (3) 32.1 30.7 44.1 22.7 6.0 4.1
Developed economies (4) 39.8 28.4 43.5 24.3 3.4 5.8
Emerging (5) 21.8 2.2 22.3 2.7 5.9 1.6
TablE II.1
Comparison of stock market returns (1)
(percent)
(1) Percentage change in the index in local currency, from the beginning of the year to the statistical closing 
date of this Financial Stability Report.
(2) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru.
(3) Australia, Canada, Norway and New Zealand. 
(4) Norway, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, France, United Kingdom and United States
(5) Indonesia, Hungary, Croatia, Malaysia, Philippines, Colombia, Argentina, Czech Rep., Turkey, India, South 
Africa, Poland, Chile, Mexico and Brazil. 
Source: Bloomberg.
FIGURE II.11
Exchange rate volatility (*)
(annualized percent, in local currency)
(*) The 20-day moving average of the daily change in the exchange 
rate. The sample includes the same countries as figure II.9, plus the 
Eurozone, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Norway, Australia, New 
Zealand, Indonesia and Vietnam.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Bloomberg.
In the foreign exchange market, the Chilean peso has depreciated significantly 
since mid-2013, reaching just over $570 to the dollar in March of this year. This 
depreciation has been greater than the average of the countries in the region 
and other commodity exporters (figure II.10). The exchange rate was over $550 
to the dollar at the close of this Report.
The peso has not only depreciated more sharply, but also been more volatile, 
with volatility ranking in the 90th percentile of a broad sample of countries at 
the close of this Report (figure II.11).
As mentioned previously, the possibility of continued volatility in the exchange 
rate and the stock market in the short term cannot be discarded. 
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III. CREDIT USERS
FIGURE III.2
Indebtedness by economic sector, 2009–2013(*)
(total debt over annual sales)
FIGURE III.1
Total debt of nonfinancial firms (1)
(percent of GDP) (2)
(*) Each bar represents data for December of each year, starting 
in 2009 and ending in 2013. The financial services and community 
services sectors are excluded. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF and SVS data.
(1) The dotted line indicates the closing date of the last Report.
(2) GDP in the moving year ending in each quarter.
(3) Corporate bonds (excluding Codelco), securitized bonds with 
nonbank underlying assets and commercial papers, at market value.
(4) Converted to pesos using the average exchange rate in the 
moving year.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on Achef, SBIF and SVS data.
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Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on Achef, SBIF and SVS data.
Indicator
Avg. 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Share
Growth 
contribu-
tion (1) 05-07 IV IV IV IV IV I II III IV I
Local debt 12.6 6.8 2.5 3.8 10.6 8.1 8.1 6.1 5.6 5.3 3.4 66.4 2.4
  Bank and other loans 13.9 9.2 -1.3 4.3 13.5 10.4 10.1 8.0 7.1 6.2 4.2 53.8 2.3
    Commercial loans 12.6 6.2 8.8 1.9 9.6 12.0 10.9 8.2 7.5 7.0 4.5 41.1 1.9
    Foreign trade 16.8 32.5 -39.5 11.5 38.5 3.4 8.2 10.5 7.2 5.5 3.4 6.5 0.2
    Factoring and leasing (2) 19.7 2.1 -10.2 15.0 16.4 7.9 7.6 4.2 4.2 2.3 3.2 6.1 0.2
  Locally listed instruments (3) 8.1 -1.4 17.0 2.3 1.3 -0.3 0.5 -1.5 -0.2 1.4 0.1 12.6 0.0
External debt (4) -0.9 13.4 16.7 4.6 8.3 20.5 16.9 13.1 8.3 7.5 15.9 33.6 4.9
   Loans 6.1 19.0 18.8 -10.6 -4.4 6.8 2.4 -2.6 -4.2 -5.9 4.5 12.2 0.6
   Commercial credits 3.4 -1.4 -19.6 16.2 12.7 -7.5 -10.4 -10.5 -11.3 -6.2 -3.1 3.1 -0.1
   Bonds -11.1 -1.6 51.7 26.1 24.5 13.4 4.7 5.1 -8.4 7.1 20.9 6.3 1.2
   FDI-related loans -25.2 36.0 38.1 47.0 28.8 82.8 82.0 69.6 53.7 32.0 34.4 12.1 3.3
Total 8.6 8.5 6.4 4.1 9.9 11.8 10.7 8.1 6.4 6.0 7.3 100.0 7.3
TABLE III.1
Financing sources
(real annual change)
FIRMS
Business debt increased slightly relative to GDP, mainly due to the 
higher debt associated with foreign direct investment (FDI).
In the first quarter of 2014, business debt increased in GDP terms, reaching 97%, 
the highest level since 2005 (figure III.1). FDI was central to this dynamic, as 
mentioned in past Reports, increasing from 5% of GDP in 2011 to 12% in 2014. 
While this component continues to record double-digit annual growth rates, it 
has slowed in the last two quarters (table III.1), consistent with the drop in FDI 
flows (chapter I). By sector, the increase has been concentrated in transportation 
and telecommunications; mining; and electricity, gas and water (figure III.2).
On aggregate, the firms that report to the Superintendence of Securities and 
Insurance (SVS) maintain financial debt of 70% of equity, which is high relative to 
the previous period of 2012 (figure III.3). The debt-to-equity ratio has increased, 
in particular, among firms tied to construction and transportation, reaching the 
highest level of the last ten years (table III.2). From an international perspective, 
corporate debt is higher than in other Latin American countries and higher than a 
group of countries with a similar per capita GDP, but lower than in the developed 
economies (box III.1).20
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FIGURE III.3
Corporate sector debt (1)(2)
(times)
FIGURE III.5
Currency mismatch of corporate sector firms (*)
(percent of total assets)
FIGURE III.4
Corporate sector profitability (1)(2)
(percent)
(1) Debt-equity ratio.
(2) Data for December of each year.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SVS data.
(*) Based on a sample of firms that report their financial statements 
in pesos. The mismatch is calculated as dollar liabilities minus dollar 
assets, minus the net derivatives position, as a percent of total 
assets.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SVS data.
(1) Earnings before interest and taxes accumulated in twelve months, 
over total assets.
(2) Data for December of each year.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SVS data.
TABLE III.2
Corporate sector debt (1)(2)
(times)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Construction 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.55 0.67 0.60 0.58 0.72 0.78 0.83
Consumer 0.65 0.58 0.63 0.79 0.84 0.70 0.79 0.77 0.95 0.76
Transport and Communications 0.53 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.72 0.93 0.89 1.01 0.96 1.07
Food 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.42 0.49 0.39 0.38 0.50 0.55 0.61
Services and other 0.89 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.71 1.31 1.28 1.29 1.13 1.16
EGW 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.64 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.53
Forestry  0.27 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.43 0.51 0.52
Total 0.60 0.59 0.60 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.68 0.73 0.71
(1) Debt-equity ratio.
(2) Data for December of each year.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SVS data. 0.2
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Aggregate corporate returns have dropped below the levels recorded 
in the mid-2000s.
The return on assets of firms that report to the SVS was 5.6% in December 2013 
(5.8% excluding state companies), which is lower than the average for 2004–
2008 (figure III.4). However, a comparison with other groups of countries reveals 
that the lower earnings in Chile is not an isolated phenomenon (box III.1).
By sector, the return on assets of the consumer sector dropped to less than half, 
while the food sector recovered relative to 2012, when returns were abnormally 
low. In construction, earnings declined to levels similar to 2010–11 (table III.3).
TABLE III.3
Corporate sector profitability (1)(2)
(percent)
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Construction 8.9 9.1 11.4 7.7 5.2 3.7 4.4 4.0 5.1 4.4
Consumer 5.7 7.1 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 5.4 4.2 7.1 2.8
Transportation and Telecommunications 13.2 3.9 6.5 7.7 7.2 7.2 9.2 2.7 5.0 3.0
Food 6.5 8.1 9.7 10.1 6.3 10.2 11.8 9.6 3.3 6.2
Services and other 6.5 7.0 6.0 6.6 6.1 5.7 6.9 8.3 8.6 7.5
EGW 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.4 7.9 11.7 9.4 8.5 8.8 8.9
Forestry 7.1 5.0 5.0 7.8 4.5 4.3 7.0 6.9 4.2 5.2
Total 7.1 6.5 6.8 7.1 6.6 7.6 8.2 7.0 6.5 5.8
(1) Earnings before interest and taxes accumulated in twelve months over total assets.
(2) Data for December of each year.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SVS data.
The currency mismatch was stable in the sample of SVS-reporting firms.
Over the last few years, the external debt of nonfinancial firms has increased 
more than local debt, exceeding 30% of GDP (figure III.1). The corporate sector’s 
residual short-term external debt (RSTED) was 8% of GDP at year-end 2013, 
which is consistent with the historical pattern for the sector (figure I.7). Two 
percentage points of the RSTED correspond to FDI-related debt coming due; 
most of the remainder involves foreign trade credits tied to imports. This overall 
increase in external debt has not translated into an increase in the share of SVS-
reporting firms with a currency mismatch of over 10%. In fact, the mismatch has 
been practically constant, with only a slight increase in the last quarter of 2013 
(figure III.5).21
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FIGURE III.6
Sectoral debt and use of currency derivatives, 
2011–2013 (*)
(percent of total debt)
(*) Each bar represents data for December of each year, starting in 
2011 and ending in 2013. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
1/ includes financial services, community services and unclassified activities, which together represented 
43% of total bank debt in 2013.
FIGURE III.7
Default ratios on commercial loans
(percent of loans)
(*) Excluding financial services, community services and companies 
with no sectoral classification.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
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FIGURE III.8
Unpaid installments ratio (1)(2)
(percent of loans)
(1) Excluding financial services, community services and companies 
with no sectoral classification.
(2) Data are for December of each year, except 2014 (March).
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
Considering  the  full  sample  of  nonfinancial  firms,  the  percentage  of  debt 
denominated in foreign currency—both local and external—is almost 50% of 
total debt, excluding the services sector1/ (figure III.6). Mining and construction 
have the highest rates, which is consistent with the type of market in which they 
participate. Agriculture also has a high share, but it originates from local banks. In 
terms of evolution, the share of foreign currency debt in total debt has increased 
marginally in these sectors in the past year, driven by mining and transportation. 
The net derivatives position appears to be consistent with hedging strategies for 
international trade exposure in the different sectors. Given the sharp volatility of 
the exchange rate in the past few months, it is advisable for firms to cover this risk 
through their assets or derivative positions. 
Payment indicators have deteriorated in recent quarters.
The nonperforming loan ratio of the commercial portfolio has been stable since 
the last Report, as has the unpaid installments ratio. The latter is calculated with 
administrative data that support a disaggregation by sector. When the services 
sectors are excluded from the calculation, the aggregate unpaid installments ratio 
increases (figure III.7). The payment indicator worsens across the board among 
the remaining sectors (figure III.8).
In sum, the indebtedness of firms (as a share of GDP) has increased at the 
margin and is now at its highest level since 2005. Among firms that report to 
the SVS, leveraging is stable but high relative to previous years, especially among 
companies related to construction and transportation. The profitability of the 
corporate sector has continued to decline over the last year. With the exception 
of the services sectors, there has been a widespread deterioration in payment 
behavior on bank debt.
REAL ESTATE SECTOR 
As in previous quarters, new home sales remain strong, while 
inventories are low. 
New home sales in Santiago continue to be dynamic. The percentage of sales with 
immediate delivery is still relatively low, although higher than at year-end 2013 
(figure III.9). The largest companies in the sector are carrying a lower inventory 
of homes available for sale than at the close of the last Report. Thus, a moderate 
contraction in housing demand would not significantly increase the number of 
months to sell existing inventory.22
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(*) Preliminary results.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the SII and the 
Chilean Chamber of Construction.
Source: Global Property Solutions.
FIGURE III.10
Real housing prices
(fixed-base index: March 2004=100)
FIGURE III.11
Market for class A and A+ offices
(thousands of square meters, percent)
FIGURE III.9
New home sales by stage of construction
(percent of total units)
(*) Includes sales of homes in various stages of construction (in 
construction, foundations laid, excavations only) and not yet started. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the Chilean 
Chamber of Construction.
2/ This figure was lower than projected due to delays in the handover of several projects.
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TABLE III.4
Financial indicators of construction and real estate companies (1)
(percent, times)
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
Return on assets (2)  9.7   6.8   4.9   3.6   5.8   5.3   5.5   4.7 
Indebtedness (3)  0.69   0.88   1.12   1.09   1.04   1.13   1.19   1.27 
Debt in pesos / Total debt (2)  48.0   67.5   67.4   56.0   55.2   52.2   66.0   71.4 
Operating flow (2)  5.5  -4.0  -5.5   3.9   4.6   0.3  -8.7  -3.0 
(1) Includes the seven largest companies in the sector that report to the SVS.
(2) Percent.
(3) Financial debt/Equity. Times.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SVS data.
The available data show that aggregate home prices continued to 
grow in 2013.
In the fourth quarter of 2013, home prices grew at annual rates of 10%, with 
an upward dynamic that was recorded at the national level as well as in the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region (figure III.10). Market indices, which have less 
coverage but are more current, suggest that this growth rate continued through 
the first quarter of 2014.
While the increase in home prices in recent years is consistent with the evolution 
of income, interest rates and construction costs, there is a strong degree 
of heterogeneity in the growth of prices. In particular, there are important 
differences by type of home (house prices have grown more than apartments) 
and by geographic location (with the fastest growth in the northern regions of the 
country and in the eastern municipalities of the Santiago Metropolitan Region) 
(box III.2).
The vacancy rate has increased in the office market, as expected.
The office market recorded a strong increase in new available space in 20132/ 
(figure III.11). Consequently, vacancy rates rose to 4.8% for class A office space 
and 5.9% for class B as of December 2013 (GPS, 2013; CBRE Chile, 2013). For 
2014, vacancy estimates point to a new increase, as nearly 400,000 square 
meters are projected to come on the market, which is over the average of the 
last decade. To date, rental prices have not been affected, but the new projects 
scheduled to be finished in 2014–16 could feel an impact, especially in less prime 
locations. 
Financial indicators have deteriorated for firms in the sector.
The group of large construction and real estate companies that report to the SVS 
recorded profitability of around 5% in December 2013, which is the lowest rate 
of the last four years (table III.4). Effective cash flow generation has decreased 
in the last two years, while indebtedness has increased, especially in short-term 
debt. With regard to lending standards, the Bank Lending Survey reports tighter 
conditions on credit to construction and real estate companies (figure III.12).23
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Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the SBIF, SuSeSo 
and SVS.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
FIGURE III.13
Household debt
(percent of disposable income)
FIGURE III.14
Mortgage loans by size 
(percent)
(1) From June 2010, includes banks that have loans in the respective 
segment.
(2) The difference between the number of the banks that thought 
approval standards were tighter or looser relative to last quarter, as 
a percent of total responses. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
FIGURE III.12
Change in the supply of credit (1)(2)
(percent of total responses)
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
III 09 III 10 III 11 III 12 III 13 III 14
T
i
g
h
t
e
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Construction  Real estate
 
L
o
o
s
e
r
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13
DTI FIR
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
09 10 11 12 13 14
< 1,000 UF
1,000 - 2,000 UF
2,000 - 3,000 UF
3,000 - 4,000 UF
> 4,000 UF
(1) Percentage points.
(2) Includes securitized mortgage debt. 
(3) Family compensation funds (Cajas de Compensación de Asignación Familiar).
(4) Includes car financing, student loans, insurance companies and the central government.
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Indicator
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Growth 
contribu-
tion (1)
Share
IV IV IV I II III IV I II III IV
Mortgage 8.5 7.2 7.0 7.0 7.5 7.7 7.6 8.3 8.4 8.6 8.9 5.1 57.8
    Bank 9.7 9.2 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 4.7 51.8
    Nonbank (2) 1.1 -5.8 -0.7 -0.9 1.4 3.0 2.0 4.0 4.1 5.6 7.4 0.4 6.0
Consumer 5.0 6.9 7.0 4.8 5.0 5.1 6.8 6.9 7.7 6.8 6.8 2.9 42.2
    Bank 3.3 8.8 13.3 11.0 10.7 10.4 8.9 9.3 9.6 7.7 8.2 2.1 26.1
    Nonbank 0.2 4.7 -7.6 -9.4 -10.2 -10.2 -2.3 -2.9 -1.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 10.3
        Retailers -8.4 6.1 -15.1 -17.7 -19.0 -19.1 -5.6 -7.3 -5.8 -3.2 -0.5 0.0 4.9
        CCAF (3) 9.7 3.8 5.2 3.6 2.5 0.6 3.5 3.9 7.3 8.3 4.1 0.2 3.6
        Cooperatives 16.7 2.1 -5.1 -5.5 -4.4 -1.8 -3.3 -3.6 -3.9 -6.5 -5.6 -0.1 1.7
    Other (4) 36.8 3.6 18.3 13.6 17.3 17.0 17.8 17.3 16.6 15.7 13.6 0.8 5.8
Total 7.0 7.0 7.0 6.1 6.4 6.6 7.2 7.7 8.1 7.9 8.0 8.0 100.0
TABLE III.5
Household debt
(real annual change, percent)
In sum, the risks for the real estate sector described in past Financial Stability 
Reports remain an issue. With low inventories, home prices continued to rise 
in 2013. Both buyers and sellers need to bear in mind that this dynamic and 
the current level of home prices may not be sustainable in the future. Moreover, 
payment indicators have deteriorated in recent quarters, and the profitability of 
companies in the sector has declined. Therefore, a scenario in which the demand 
for housing suddenly weakens could have significant consequences for the sector. 
This is exacerbated by the situation in the office market, where the vacancy rate 
has increased and is expected to continue rising as a large amount of new office 
space comes on the market. 
HOUSEHOLDS
Aggregate debt has increased marginally in the last two quarters.
Household debt increased in late 2013 to 57% of disposable income (versus 
55% at year-end 2012). The financial burden increased to 14.6% of disposable 
income, although the growth rate slowed. The composition of consumer versus 
mortgage  debt  and  its  contribution  to  the  financial  burden  did  not  change 
significantly (figure III.13).
The growth of household debt continues to be driven by bank debt.
Total household debt grew 8.0% in the fourth quarter of 2013, with a strong 
share in the banking system. Bank mortgages grew 9.1% in real annual terms, 
while the real annual growth rate of bank consumer debt was 8.2% (table III.5).
In the case of nonbank lenders, the annual growth rate of mortgage loans had 
increased at year-end 2013, but the nonbank share of this type of loan remains 
limited. Nonbank consumer loans did not grow in annual terms in the last two 
quarters, retaining a share of 28% of this type of loan.24
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Source: Central Bank of Chile.
FIGURE III.15
Loan-to-value ratio
(percent of loan)
(1) Mortgages excluding BancoEstado.
(2) A three-month lag is used for the comparative basis. Quarterly 
data.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
(*) A three-month lag is used for the comparative basis. CCAF: 
Family compensation funds.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SuSeSo and SVS data.
FIGURE III.16
90-day default rate of banks (1)(2)
(percent of loans)
FIGURE III.17
90-day default rate of nonbank lenders
(percent of loans)
TABLE III.6
Household bank debt
(real annual change, percent)
2011 2012 2013 2014
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I (*)
Mortgage 9.6 9.1 8.7 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.5
    No. of debtors 4.2 4.1 3.5 2.6 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0
    Average debt 5.2 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.7 6.0 5.9 5.9 6.3 6.4 6.2 6.1 6.3
Consumer 12.2 13.1 13.8 13.3 11.0 10.7 10.4 8.9 9.3 9.6 7.7 8.2 7.2
    No. of debtors 5.2 7.4 7.8 8.1 10.0 9.3 9.1 9.6 7.6 6.5 4.3 2.1 1.0
    Average debt 6.6 5.3 5.5 4.8 0.9 1.3 1.2 -0.7 1.5 2.9 3.2 6.0 6.1
(*) Data for February.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
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Bank debt has grown as a result of an increase in average household 
debt and not in the number of debtors.
In bank mortgages, the average debt has grown faster than the number of 
debtors (table III.6), and there has been a compositional shift toward larger 
loans, consistent with the higher home prices (figure III.14). In consumer debt, 
after several quarters, average debt grew faster than the number of debtors. 
This slower growth of debtors is consistent with the contraction of specialized 
consumer divisions in the banking sector recorded since mind-2013 (chapter IV). 
Lending standards have tightened somewhat for mortgages and been 
stable for consumer loans.
According to the Bank Lending Survey for March 2014, lending conditions are 
slightly tighter for mortgages and have not changed for consumer loans. Banks 
report that mortgages continue to be highly concentrated in the segment with a 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 80 and 90%. If anything, there has been a slight drop 
in the percentage of loans granted with over 90% financing and an increase in 
mortgages with an LTV of 70 to 80% (figure III.15).
Aggregate payment indicators have not deteriorated despite the 
increase in household debt
In bank mortgage loans, the 90-day default rate continued to decline, in terms 
of both the real value and the lagged basis. In bank consumer loans, there was 
a marginal increase in the last quarter of 2013, which was partially reversed in 
early 2014, but the rate is still lower than the last two years (figure III.16). Among 
nonbank lenders, the 90-day default rate has declined for retailers, whereas it 
has worsened for the family compensation funds (Cajas de Compensación de 
Asignación Familiar). The latter group was affected by regulatory changes, 
including the standardization of default reporting requirements (figure III.17).
In sum, household debt continues to grow at around the rates recorded in 
previous periods. The share of bank credit has grown, mainly through an increase 
in average debt. Consequently, aggregate indebtedness has increased slightly, 
but payment indicators have not deteriorated. This is consistent with the greater 
relative supply of credit to upper- and middle-income households described in 
past Reports. 25
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BOX III.1 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NONFINANCIAL CORPORATE 
SECTOR: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
1/ The countries with a comparable GDP are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, 
Poland, Russia, Turkey and South Africa, which had a per capita GDP of between 
US$7,900 and US$13,390 in 2011. The Latin American sample includes Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. The developed countries are Canada, Germany, 
Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and the United States.
2/ For more details, see Ramírez and Vásquez (2014).
FIGURE III.18
Return on assets (1)(2)
(percent) 
(1) EBIT/Total assets. Group weighted average.
(2) Datastream data downloaded in the first half of 2014.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Datastream.
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FIGURE III.19
Indebtedness (1)(2)
(times)
(1) Financial debt/Equity. Group weighted average.
(2) Datastream data downloaded in the first half of 2014.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Datastream.
This box compares the performance of the Chilean corporate 
sector  against  different  samples  of  countries  for  the  period 
2000–12, in terms of profitability, indebtedness, financing costs 
and interest coverage ratios. This exercise supports the analysis 
of both the evolution and the level of these financial variables 
relative to other economies that can serve as a benchmark. As in 
any international comparison, even countries that seem similar 
may have important differences in terms of their institutional, 
legal and financial development, which complicates the analysis. 
These factors are not considered in this box, which could limit 
the scope of the conclusions.
The comparison uses three samples of countries: (i) developing 
countries  with  a  comparable  GDP  per  capita,  based  on  the 
IMF classification (2013); (ii) Latin America; and (iii) developed 
countries1/.  The  data  are  from  Datastream,  an  international 
financial database. The information in this database differs from 
the data used in chapter III, which are reported by the SVS. The 
main differences are as follows: (i) Datastream mainly includes 
exchange-listed firms, which are a subset of the firms registered 
in the SVS database; (ii) Datastream does not correct for the 
parent-affiliate  effect,  which  induces  double  accounting,  for 
which the Central Bank made an internal correction based on 
ownership information contained in the financial statements; 
and (iii) there are differences in the values of financial variables 
in the two databases2/.
Results
In  the  period  under  analysis,  the  Chilean  corporate  sector 
was less profitable than both the comparable GDP and Latin 
American groups (figure III.18). All the groups recorded declining 
profitability starting in 2010, although the trend was less marked 
in the developed countries. 
With regard to the level of indebtedness, Chile is above the 
comparable  GDP  and  Latin American  groups  and  below  the 
developed countries (figure III.19).
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FIGURE III.20
Cost of financing (1)(2)
(percent) 
(1) Financial expense/Financial debt. Group weighted average.
(2) Datastream data downloaded in the first half of 2014.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Datastream.
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FIGURE III.21
Interest coverage ratio (1)(2)
(times)
(1) EBIT/Financial expense. Group weighted average.
(2) Datastream data downloaded in the first half of 2014.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Datastream.
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Financing  costs  in  Chile  are  consistently  lower  than  in  the 
comparable GDP and Latin American countries and equal to 
the developed country group. However, financing costs have 
fallen for the comparable GDP and Latin American groups in 
recent years, although they are still higher than in the developed 
countries (figure III.20). 
Finally, interest coverage ratios have fallen across the board 
in all the groups in recent years, as a result of a decrease in 
profitability and the stabilization of financial expense over assets 
(figure III.21). Chile’s ratio is similar to that of the comparable 
GDP group.
In sum, the trend for the profitability, indebtedness and interest 
coverage ratios of Chilean firms is not substantially different 
from the comparison groups. Although the indebtedness level is 
higher than in the comparable GDP and Latin American groups, 
financing costs are lower throughout the period of comparison. 
However, the materialization of the risk scenarios described in 
this Report could lead to significant changes in external financing 
costs. When combined with the higher indebtedness and lower 
interest coverage ratio, this could generate difficulties in terms 
of meeting obligations. Firms thus need to correctly assimilate 
these factors in their debt behavior. 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind, again, that while the 
Datastream  database  provides  an  alternative  for  carrying 
out international comparisons, important caveats include the 
structural differences between seemingly comparable countries 
and the parent-affiliate effect, which is not corrected in this 
database.27
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BOX III.2 HOUSING PRICES IN CHILE 
1/ For more details on the calculation methodology, see Central Bank of Chile (2014b).
2/ The advantages of this data source are that it is based on actual transactions, rather 
than theoretical valuations (Eurostat, 2013), and that it has national coverage.  
3/ Other methodologies used for this purpose are repeat sales and hedonic prices. In the 
case of the former, there is not a sufficiently long time series; in the latter, the database 
does not include detailed information on home characteristics (Vio, 2012). 
4/ The north includes the regions of Arica y Parinacota, Tarapacá, Antofagasta and 
Atacama. The central region includes Coquimbo, Valparaíso, Libertador Bernardo 
O’Higgins and Maule. The south covers Biobío, la Araucanía, los Ríos, los Lagos, Aysén 
and Magallanes.
5/ This index does not reflect changes in quality and composition that could arise within 
each group.
FIGURE III.22
Home prices by type of dwelling (*)
(fixed-base index: 2008 = 100)
(*) Preliminary results.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the Internal Revenue Service (SII).
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The  correct  analysis  and  measurement  of  housing  prices  is 
essential for an adequate assessment of the real estate sector 
and financial stability. This box describes the methodology and 
main results of the implementation of a housing price index 
(HPI) for Chile, which will be published by the Central Bank1/. 
The HPI includes breakdowns by type of property—houses and 
apartments— and geographic region.
Methodology and data sources
The HPI is constructed using anonymous administrative records 
from  the  Chilean  Internal  Revenue  Service,  corresponding  to 
actual new and used home transactions in the period 2002–132/. 
This information is complemented with the nonagricultural real 
estate registry, which contains relevant information including 
land surface area and quality, zoning and size of construction.
The method used is stratification or mixed adjustment, which 
was chosen based on the data available in Chile and a review 
of international best practices3/. This methodology is consistent 
with chained national account measures, with reference year 
2008. The method measures price changes in different groups of 
homes according to certain characteristics. 
Fourteen groups are considered, based on different combinations 
of the following characteristics:
• 7 geographic regions: the north, the center (excluding the 
Santiago Metropolitan Region), the south and four subdivisions 
of the Santiago Metropolitan Region (SMR) (east, west, center 
and south)4/; and
• 2 types of housing: houses and apartments.
The aggregate price index combines the simple average of the 
price index for each group—in UFs (Unidad de Fomento, an 
inflation-indexed unit of account) per square meter—weighted 
by the square meters traded in the previous year5/.
The aggregate HPI and its decomposition by type of property 
and geographic region will have a quarterly frequency and will 
be published half-yearly by the Central Bank.
Results
As analyzed in chapter III, the aggregate housing price index 
continued to grow in 2013 (figure III.10). The breakdown by 
type of property reveals a difference in the growth of houses 
and apartments (figure III.22). Both indices grew at similar rates 
through late 2009, at an average of around 3% in real annual 
terms. Beginning in the first quarter of 2010, however, the house 
price index increased more than apartments, posting an average 
real annual growth rate of 8% in 2010–13. The earthquake 
in February 2010 may have contributed to this development 
due to the relative increase in the demand for houses versus 
apartments. 28
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FIGURE III.23
Home prices by geographic region (1)
(fixed-base index: 2008 = 100)
FIGURE III.24
Santiago Metropolitan Region: home prices by area (*)
(fixed-base index: 2008 = 100)
(1) Preliminary results.
(2) Excluding the Santiago Metropolitan Region.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the SII.
(*) Preliminary results.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from the SII.
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The results by geographic region also demonstrate dispersion. 
Since the third quarter of 2012, the north has grown faster than the 
rest of the country (figure III.23), which is due, in part, to dynamic 
mining investments in that region. Similarly, the eastern district 
of the Santiago Metropolitan Region has posted higher growth 
rates than the rest of the Region since early 2013 (figure III.24). 
As indicated in previous Reports, the eastern SMR is characterized 
by particularly low inventories and a limited supply of land, which 
could explain the price increases.29
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IV. BANKING SYSTEM
FIGURE IV.2
Growth rate of commercial loans, by economic sector 
(porcentaje, variación real anual)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
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FIGURE IV.1
Growth rate of loans (1)
(percent, real annual change) 
(1) The vertical dotted line indicates the statistical closing date of 
the last Report.
(2) Excluding foreign trade loans.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
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The expansion of commercial and consumer credit has slowed in line with 
the phase of the economic cycle. Some risk indicators for the commercial 
portfolio have deteriorated, while the consumer risk indicators have stabilized. 
The potential impact of a stress scenario is higher than in previous Financial 
Stability Reports. 
The growth of commercial and consumer credit has eased, consistent 
with the less dynamic economy, while the growth rate of housing 
loans remains around 10% in real annual terms.
The slowdown in credit expansion has been steepest in the commercial portfolio, 
in line with the less dynamic output and the decrease in investment (figure IV.1). 
This trend was most visible toward the end of the first quarter, when the real 
annual growth rate dropped to 5.5% after averaging around 8% in the second 
half 2013. By sector, the decline was most evident in construction and mining 
(figure IV.2). Services, such as financial services and insurance, continue to explain 
a large share of aggregate growth. Consumer credit recorded a more moderate 
slowdown, from a real annual growth rate of 8% to 7% in the same period.
Default on commercial loans is stable, but it has increased in the 
productive sectors and in firms with lower debt.
Payment indicators for firms carrying a lower debt level have deteriorated in the 
last two years, in particular in the 500–18,000 UF segment, which is generally 
associated with SMEs (figure IV.3). Furthermore, in 2013 there was a generalized 
increase in default across productive sectors, excluding services, which in some 
cases reached the highest levels of the last five years (chapter III). This has not 
generated a significant increase in aggregate commercial default due to the 
stability of payment behavior in the services sector, especially financial services, 
which accounts for a large share of the banking industry’s commercial portfolio. 
At the same time, the banking system’s stock of provisions has risen, supporting 
stable coverage levels.
The lower growth of credit and the higher default rates in some sectors has 
coincided with a tightening of approval standards for commercial loans. 
According to the Bank Lending Survey, between December 2013 and March 
2014, supply conditions tightened for both large firms and SMEs. In contrast, 
the net survey responses indicate that lending conditions for consumer credit 
did not change in the same period.30
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FIGURE  IV.3
Default and share of commercial loans, by loan size 
(percent of respective portfolio)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
FIGURE IV.5
Growth rate of consumer loans, by loan size (*)
(real annual change, percent)
(*) Includes consumer debt of savings and loan cooperatives 
supervised by the SBIF.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
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FIGURE IV.4
Risk indicators of the consumer portfolio 
(percent of loans)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
Consumer default has stabilized, and the growth of this segment has 
been driven by larger loans.
The default rate of the consumer portfolio stabilized in the first months of 2014, 
which was accompanied by lower write-offs and provisions expense since mid-
2013 (figure IV.4). This may be associated with the shift in the composition 
of bank growth toward upper- and middle-income segments, at the expense 
of lower-income brackets, which has also been reflected in a reduction in the 
specialized divisions of large banks. Thus, the growth of consumer credit has 
been driven by the 400–3,000 UF loan segment (figure IV.5).
The  banking  system’s  profitability  has  recovered,  due  in  part  to 
transitory factors, while solvency levels remain around 13%.
The profitability of the banking sector has increased in recent months, mainly 
due to higher inflation, which was reflected in the contribution of adjustment 
margins. Banks with a larger market share have also recorded lower support 
costs. In this group, these effects offset the lower income from commissions and 
interest margins (figure IV.6). The lower interest margins could be associated 
with the aforementioned reorientation toward higher amounts, which are 
granted at lower rates than smaller loans.
In February, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) was around 13% for the system. 
Tier 2 capital increased, due to the issue of subordinated bonds for nearly 
US$650 million in the last quarter of 2013 (figure IV.7). The CAR is lower than 
the average of a broad group of countries (box IV.1)
External  financing  sources  continued  to  diversify,  and  average 
maturity increased.
The banking system continues to enjoy favorable external financing conditions, 
with an external debt of around 10% of total liabilities. After a dynamic second 
half of 2013, the issue of commercial papers in the United States eased in the 
first quarter 2014. In contrast, external bonds have grown more than other 
foreign credits (figure IV.8). Thus far in the year, the amount of these issues 
has exceeded registered issues as of the same date in 2013. In addition, the 
average maturity of external debt has increased. The mismatch between foreign 
currency asset and liability operations is stable at around 5% of effective equity.
The system retains a strong dependence on local wholesale financing, 
although to a lesser extent for medium-sized banks.
In the local market, the cost of financing has been lowered through short- and 
long-term issues (chapter II). As reported in past Financial Stability Reports, the 
dependence on wholesale financing differs by type of bank, with smaller banks 
having a higher exposure. In the first quarter of 2014, this source of financing 
increased for this group of banks (appendix figures).31
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FIGURE IV.7
Capital adequacy ratio and return on assets (*)
(percent)
(*) Based on consolidated financial statements.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
FIGURE IV.6
Change in main components of the ROA (*)
(from September 2013 to March 2014, percent)
(*) Based on consolidated financial statements.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
FIGURE IV.8
Bank debt issued overseas
(US$ million)
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
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1/ The analysis is based on the methodology described in Jara et al (2007) and Alfaro and Sagner (2011). 
Both, the analysis and the results, are regularly reported to the SBIF. 
RISK FACTORS
A sharper economic slowdown could imply an increase in credit risk, 
especially in the commercial portfolio. 
In  recent  months,  the  profitability  of  firms  has  decreased,  consistent  with 
the phase of the economic cycle, and payment compliance on bank debt has 
worsened in some sectors. This has been most visible in sectors that are more 
exposed to the cycle, especially construction, and in firms carrying lower debt 
levels. A sharper slowdown of the economy could increase the deterioration 
of the commercial portfolio in these and other sectors. The level of provisions 
constituted in each case is a key element for mitigating the impact of these 
risks.
In principle, the higher growth rate of bank loans at larger amounts 
and to higher-income segments reduces credit risk, but if the trend 
continues, it could reverse this effect.
This strategy could be increasing the financial burden and indebtedness of 
these households to levels where the risk surpasses their lower exposure to 
the cycle. Moreover, lower-income households still represent a significant share 
of the portfolio. Thus, a sharp slowdown of the economy that affects their 
payment behavior could have a strong impact on banks with a higher exposure 
to this segment.
The banking sector could face periods of volatility and higher 
financing costs in the domestic and external markets.
The materialization of the external risk scenarios (chapter I) could make it 
difficult to roll over debt overseas while increasing banks’ financing costs. This 
risk is mitigated by the limited level of external financing on aggregate and the 
banks’ diversification in the use of debt instruments, such as the issue of bonds 
and commercial papers.
Domestically, the cost of financing could increase, given its current low level. 
Sudden changes in the institutional investors’ portfolios could generate 
reversals in spreads and have a strong impact on smaller banks with a high 
exposure to wholesale financing. Although the spread in the domestic market 
remains low, a deterioration in the external scenario could cause larger market 
participants to demand more financial resources on the local market, which 
would reduce the availability of funds for other participants. 
STRESS TESTS1/
Stress tests show that the banking system is in an appropriate financial position 
to absorb the materialization of a severe stress scenario. However, it would have 
a somewhat larger impact on profitability than estimated in previous Reports.32
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FIGURE IV.10
Impact of different scenarios on return on capital (1)
(earnings over Tier 1 capital)
(1) Data are weighted by the core capital of each institution. 
(2) The minimum is the first percentile. 
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
FIGURE IV.9
Annual GDP growth
(quarterly data, percent)
(*) Baseline scenario in the March 2014 Monetary Policy Report, 
with a growth rate of 3–4% for 2014.
Source: Central Bank of Chile.
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2/ The baseline scenario is consistent with the Monetary Policy Report for March 2014, with GDP growth 
of 3 to 4% in 2014. The UF interest rate forecast in June 2014 is 4.7% for both one- to three-year loans 
and mortgage loans over 20 years.
3/ These results include reinvested earnings.
FIGURE IV.11
Impact of different scenarios on the capital adequacy 
ratio (1)(2)
(effective equity over risk-weighted assets)
(1) Data are weighted by the core capital of each institution.
(2) Calculations do not include treasury or foreign trade banks.
(3) The maximum is the 90th percentile.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
TABLE IV.1
Impact of stress tests on profitability 
(percent of Tier 1 capital)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on SBIF data.
Stress scenario
Initial ROE  15
Market risk -2.3
Valuation -1.0
Repricing -1.3
Currency 0.0
Credit risk -20.2
Consumer -8.6
Commercial -9.9
Mortgage -1.8
Margin 3.9
Final ROE  -3.6
The stress tests use macro and accounting information for the banking system 
as of December 2013. Credit risk is calculated by estimating a model that relates 
provisions—which reflect the quality of the banks’ credit portfolios— primarily 
with economic activity. Market risk is calculated based on three types of exposure: 
currency, valuation and repricing. Both risks are evaluated under the baseline and 
stress scenarios, using the methodology described in the last Report.
The stress scenario considers a drop in GDP in the short term and slower growth 
in the medium term. Accordingly, output falls 2.7% on average in 2014 and 
then converges to a 1.5% increase in 2016. This scenario aims to replicate past 
episodes of financial fragility (figure IV.9)2/
Relative to the last Financial Stability Report, based on data for June 2013, the 
current period is more favorable in terms of profitability and very similar on 
capitalization. The banking system’s return on equity (ROE) is 1.4 percentage 
points higher (15.0% versus 13.6%) and the CAR is very similar (13.2% versus 
13.3%).
In the stress scenario, the ROE would fall –3.6 percentage points of core capital 
(table IV.1), compared with 2.1 percentage points in the stress tests described 
in the last Report. At the individual level, banks that represent 62% of the 
system’s Tier 1 capital would post negative earnings (figure IV.10). A group of 
banks accounting for 60% of the system’s Tier 1 capital would have a CAR of 
over 11% (figure IV.11)3/. In the last Report, these figures were 47% and 62% 
respectively.
Stress tests are an analytical tool that contribute to identifying systemic financial 
strengths and weaknesses in a given moment of time. Given their partial 
nature, they do not necessarily uncover all the effects of specific risk scenarios. 
Consequently, they should not be interpreted as projection exercises. However, 
given the lower growth outlook, banks need to ensure that they maintain an 
adequate level of provisions and capital.33
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BOX IV.1 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF THE SOLVENCY OF THE 
CHILEAN BANKING SYSTEM
FIGURE IV.12
Capital adequacy ratio (*)
(latest available data, percent)
(*) Latest available data for 2012 or 2013.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Bankscope.
1/ Box V.1, Financial Stability Report, Second Half 2012.
2/ This analysis uses the same sample of countries as box III.1, except that more Latin 
American countries are included. For each country, the 15 largest banks are included, 
taking the latest available data for 2012 or 2013, according to the Bankscope 
database. Cooperative banks are included when local legislation treats these as banks. 
This methodology has its flaws: for some countries, the banks in the sample may 
not be representative of the system as a whole; and the methodology considers the 
banks established in each county, which implies that assets from “other countries” are 
included. The methodology is similar to that used by Arregui (2014). 3/ Chapter IIIB2 of the Compendium of Financial Regulations, Central Bank of Chile.
Basel II LGB
Cash 0 0
Exposure to sovereign or central bank debt  0-100 10 o 100 (2)
Trade credits (1) 0-100 100
Commercial mortgages  100 100
Multilateral development banks 0 100
Banks (1) 20-100 100
Consumer 75 100
Home mortgages 35 o > 60
90-day default portfolio (net of provisions) (1) 100 100
90-day default portfolio (net of provisions), mortgage loans 50-100 100
TABLE IV.2
Risk weights in the standard Basel II model and in Chile (General 
Banking Law) 
(percent)
(1) A weight of over 150% could be applied to: sovereign, state-owned or bank debt or 
corporate securities rated lower than B–; commercial credit rated lower than BB–; and 
mortgage loans in default with provisions of less than 20% of the debt.
(2) Sovereign or Central Bank of Chile debt: 10%; remainder: 100%.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on BIS and SBIF data.
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In the banking business, capital acts as a buffer for unexpected 
losses, while provisions do the same for expected losses (Borio 
et al., 2001). Determining the solvency of the banking system 
thus requires, at the very least, an assessment of its capital 
position and level of provisions. This box evaluates the relative 
international position of the local banking system on these 
variables. It also identifies some important measurement and 
regulation issues to complete the analysis.
Capital
As described in past Reports1/, international comparisons of 
banking system capital are based on the capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) and the leverage ratio. In terms of the CAR, Chile is below 
the average of a broad sample of countries (figure IV.12)2/ 
However, the CAR is defined as the ratio of regulatory capital 
to risk-weighted assets (RWA). To determine total RWA, the 
definition of the weights is critical. In Chile, these weights are 
assigned by risk category, which in some cases are higher than 
the proposed weights of the standard models incorporated in 
Basel II and upheld in Basel III (table IV.2). This could bias the 
CAR downward relative to countries that use this standard.
An additional complication in the international comparison of the 
CAR is the treatment of operational and market risk, in particular 
whether charges for these risks are included in the RWA. The 
Chilean regulation does not incorporate them, although the 
regulatory guidelines on market risk require allocating additional 
capital to cover market risk exposure (MRE)3/. Estimates by the 
SBIF, which aim to correct for these differences in the local and 
international regulations, suggest that the Chilean banking 
system, on average, would comply with the Basel III standards, 
even though this scheme is not specifically incorporated in our 
legislation. 
Given the difficulty of comparing the CAR among countries, there 
are other simpler indicators that are more robust to regulatory 
differences, such as the leverage ratio (defined here as equity over 
assets). Based on this measure, Chile’s relative solvency position 
improves  to  around  the  sample  mean  (figure  IV.13).  Basel  III 
incorporates a minimum requirement of 3% for the leverage ratio 34
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FIGURE IV.13
Banking system leverage ratio (*)
(percent)
(*) Latest available data for 2012 or 2013.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Bankscope.
FIGURE IV.14
Leverage ratio and depth of the banking system
(percent)
(1) Domestic bank credit to the private sector as a percent of GDP, 2012.
(2) Equity as a percent of assets, 2013.
Sources: IMF, World Bank, OECD estimates and Bankscope.
4/ The Basel III leverage ratio is not strictly comparable to the measure used here, in 
that the numerator includes additional Tier 1 capital and the denominator includes 
adjustments that are not available in the banks’ financial data.
FIGURE IV.15
Provisions coverage ratio (*)
(percent)
(*) Calculated as the stock of provisions divided by the 90-day default portfolio. Latest 
available data in 2012 or 2013.
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on data from Bankscope.
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as a substantive improvement over Basel II, which is very similar 
to the leverage requirement that has been in the General Banking 
Law since the 1980s4/.
Another factor to take into account is that more developed 
financial systems tend to have lower levels of capital. When 
the countries are grouped by level of financial development 
(measured as domestic bank credit over GDP), Chile’s leverage 
ratios are consistent with the depth of the banking sector 
(figure IV.14).
Provisions
Provisions allow banks to recognize anticipated losses due to 
risk in the loan portfolio. To the extent that the constituted 
provisions are sufficient, the probability of unexpected impacts 
on bank profits and thus on capital is reduced. The coverage 
ratio is widely used for this purpose. Chile’s coverage ratios are 
in the mean for the countries in the sample (figure IV.15). 
Conclusions
The solvency of the Chilean banking system, measured through 
its capital levels and provisions for credit risk, are comparable 
to countries with similar levels of development, based on the 
metrics used in this box. 
Although solvency levels appear to be appropriate, it is important 
to continue making progress on a reform of the banking 
legislation to incorporate solvency requirements in line with 
international consensus and current developments in this area. 
This would not only bring the country closer to international 
best practices, but also facilitate the international comparison 
of the local banking system. These legal modifications could be 
especially important in the case of capital levels, which under 
the  current  legislation  are  still  subject  to  specific  definitions 
associated with Basel I. In the case of provisions, in recent years, 
the SBIF has been appropriately using the powers conferred 
on the Superintendence under the General Banking Law to 
continuously improve its provisions regulations.35
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V. FINANCIAL REGULATION
1/ The statistical appendix provides information on transaction volumes in the payment systems.
This chapter reviews the most important regulatory developments at the local 
level and the most important issues in the debate on financial regulation at the 
international level1/. 
NATIONAL REGULATION
New liquidity rules
From 9 May to 6 September 2014, a proposal for fine-tuning the Central Bank 
of Chile’s rules on bank liquidity risk management will be open for public 
consultation. The new regulation pursues the following objectives:
• To strengthen liquidity risk management policies in the banking system, giving 
more responsibility to the board of directors and management and establishing 
minimum criteria for developing stress tests and contingency plans.
• To increase the quantity and quality of the information available to the 
supervisor and the market, through the inclusion of new monitoring variables 
such  as  the  liquidity  coverage  ratio  (LCR)  and  net  stable  funding  ratio 
(NSFR) from Basel III; an indicator for monitoring short-term liquidity under 
a scenario characterized by an idiosyncratic reduction of wholesale financing; 
and monitoring variables for different-quality liquid assets and concentration 
of financing sources. In terms of public information, new quantitative and 
qualitative requirements are added. 
• To fine-tune the current regulatory requirements by adding requirements for 
aggregate maturity mismatches to complement individual requirements and 
providing guidelines for the treatment of bank affiliates overseas. Adjustments 
are also being incorporated to standardize the criteria on the use of internal 
models (adjusted basis), so that similar flows will be treated similarly across 
all banks.
For now, the new Basel quantitative requirements will not be incorporated into 
the current regulatory limits. Once the new regulations enter into effect, the 
SBIF and the Bank will be able to estimate the LCR and NSFR more precisely. 
In addition to providing better quality information at a higher frequency—for 36
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2/ http://www.bcentral.cl/normativa/consulta-publica/Antecedentesconsultaliquidez_09052014.pdf.
3/ The Bank’s power to grant this authorization was incorporated together with the Capital Market 
Reform III, enacted in 2010.
example,  on  high-quality  liquid  assets  (HQLA)  and  financing  sources—the 
information captured in the observation period (around one year) will support 
the necessary adjustments and calibrations so that the new regulations can 
provide the foundation for adopting the LCR as a regulatory requirement and 
improving the current limits. 
More details on the regulations open to public consultation are available on the 
Central Bank’s website2/. Box V.1 assesses the state of implementation of the 
Basel III liquidity rules at the international level.
Foreign securities transactions in pesos
The Securities Market Law (Ley de Mercado de Valores, LMV) establishes that 
foreign securities must be denominated in foreign currency or, alternatively, in 
national currency but with payments made in foreign currency. To be traded and 
paid in pesos an authorization of Central Bank is required and it can establishes 
terms and conditions on the operations3/.
Over the past few years, the supply of foreign securities has increased on the 
local market, mainly in the form of exchange-traded fund (ETF) shares and 
stocks. In addition, various private sector agents have requested the Central 
Bank to grant the authorization covered under the Securities Market Law. The 
Bank, in turn, considered that this would not only facilitate the development of a 
broader spectrum of investment alternatives, as in the case of the authorization 
in 2006 for nonresidents to issue peso-denominated bonds (“huaso bonds”), 
but also allow the associated transactions to be cleared and settled through 
a central counterparty, which has more robust infrastructure and systems for 
managing operational risk and guarantees. 
Thus, following a period of public consultation, in May 2014 the Bank authorized 
that transactions associated with foreign exchange-traded funds (ETF), stocks 
and securities certificates can be denominated and paid in pesos. 
This authorization is subject to the following conditions: (i) the instruments 
must be eligible for being publicly traded on the securities markets of the issuer 
country or other markets; (ii) the issuer must be established in a country that is a 
member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or an equivalent organization, 
aimed at combatting money laundering and terrorist financing, and that is not 
listed as an uncooperative country or a tax haven; (iii) the instruments must be 
registered in the Foreign Securities Registry maintained by the SVS; and (iv) the 
instruments must be traded on the securities exchange.
It is further established that these instruments must be held in custody by 
a securities custody and deposit firm, constituted in accordance with Law 
18,876. The firm(s) must report monthly to the Central Bank on changes, at the 
aggregate level, of the custody of these instruments. The exchanges on which 37
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4/ See the Financial Stability Report for the first and second halves of 2012 and the second half of 2013.
5/ The FSB indicates that there are twelve CCPs for commodity derivatives, six for credit derivatives, seven for 
equity derivatives, nine for currency contracts and sixteen for interest rate derivatives. See OTC Derivatives 
Market Reforms: Seventh Progress Report on Implementation. FSB, 8 April 2014.
they are traded must report the total volume of transactions on a monthly basis. 
Finally, the authorization also addresses aspects of compliance with the foreign 
exchange regulations. Thus, while the associated transactions in pesos between 
residents are not foreign exchange operations, there could be foreign exchange 
operations associated with the transactions, such as the purchase or sale of 
foreign securities overseas or the purchase or sale of these securities in the 
local market by nonresidents, which must comply with the current regulations.
Changes to the regulations on the issue and operation of prepaid 
debit cards 
The Central Bank published for public consultation changes to the regulations 
on the issue and operation of prepaid debit cards (stored value), contained in 
Chapter III.J.3 of the Compendium of Financial Regulations. The objective is 
to remove regulatory requirements that could be inhibiting the development 
of this means of payment, without introducing additional risks to the retail 
payments system. Congress is currently discussing legal changes to provide for 
the possible future issue of prepaid cards by nonbank entities, which therefore 
are not considered in the changes to Chapter III.J.3.
The main changes are as follows: (i) the elimination of the requirement of prior 
authorization by the Central Bank in order for banks to issue prepaid cards, as 
well as for different companies to provide the service of operating such cards; 
(ii) the integration of the regulations affecting prepaid card operators, so that 
a single entity can operate debit, credit and prepaid cards, given compliance 
with specific requirements; (iii) the raising of the limit on anonymous disposable 
cards; and (iv) the authorization to use identified prepaid cards overseas. More 
details are available on the Central Bank’s website4/.
Tables V.1 and V.2 present the main regulations published and opened for 
public consultation, respectively.
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION
In order to assess the pending challenges for Latin America with regard to 
the global reform of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market, the Bank 
organized a joint seminar with the IMF in January. 
As  discussed  in  previous  Reports,  following  the  international  financial 
crisis of 2008, the G20 adopted a series of commitments to strengthen the 
infrastructure for OTC derivatives. The first economies to enact such legislation 
were  the  United  States,  through  the  Dodd-Frank  Act,  and  the  European 
Union, through the European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR)5/. The 
G20 commitments are reflected in a review and updating of the Principles 38
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TABLE V.1
Main regulations issued in the first half of 2014
Date Organization Regulation Material and objective
03-Dec-2013 SVS GENERAL REGULATION (NCG) 355 To raise the operating standards of external audit firms, with a focus on the technical expertise and independence of 
partners and participants.
04-Dec-2013 SVS EXEMPT RESOLUTION 423 To incorporate the clearing and settlement of derivatives in the operating regulations of CCLV, Contraparte Central S.A.
19-Dec-2013 SVS NCG 357 To facilitate the underwriting of foreign securities in the SVS registry by administrators. 
06-Mar-2014 SVS NCG 361 and NCG 362 To raise the operating standards and modernize the use of rating agencies and to establish conditions for carrying out 
complementary activities.
20-Mar-2014 Central Bank
AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTER VI OF THE COMPENDIUM
OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS
To incorporate commissions charges for reimbursement requests processed by the Central Bank for local authorized 
institutions and to limit the instruments that are covered under the Reciprocal Payment and Credit Agreement-Aladi.
30-Apr-2014 SVS NCG 363 To establish the timelines and information to be presented by all parties that must enroll in the Registry of Portfolio 
Managers.
05-May-2014 Central Bank RESOLUTION 1820-03-140430 
To authorize transaction and payment in pesos of mutual fund or foreign investment fund shares corresponding to 
ETFs, shares in foreign corporations and foreign securities certificates, in order to promote investment alternatives in 
the local market, and to allow clearing and settlement through a central counterparty.
TABLE V.2
Main regulations published for public consultation in the first half of 2014
Date Organization Regulation Material and objectives
18-Dec-2013 SBIF
EXTENSION OF PUBLIC CONSULTATION CLOSED 
To align the local regulatory guidelines with international standards and to introduce new prudential elements that 
promote the development of healthy risk management practices. AMENDMENT TO CHAPTER B -1 OF THE COMPENDIUM OF 
ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS 
28-Jan-2014 SVS
PUBLIC CONSULTATION CLOSED To revise and modernize the current requirements established for voluntary pension savings plans (APV) and 
collective voluntary pension savings plans (APVC) in order to promote competition and efficiency in the industry. REPEAL OF CIRCULAR 1898 OF 2008 ON APV AND APVC
13-Feb-2014 SBIF
PUBLIC CONSULTATION CLOSED
To capture credit risk in bank provisions and to promote the gradual adoption of best practices in risk management, 
thereby ensuring the preservation of the robustness of the local banking system over time.  APPENDIX 2 OF CHAPTER B-1 OF THE COMPENDIUM OF 
ACCOUNTING REGULATIONS
07-Mar-2014 SBIF
PUBLIC CONSULTATION CLOSED To move toward a model in which the banks will adopt the decision to externalize some specified services without 
requiring prior authorization by the SBIF, in compliance with various requirements in the regulations governing 
operational risk management. MODIFICA CAPÍTULO 20-7 DE LA RAN
16-Apr-2014 SVS
PUBLIC CONSULTATION CLOSED
To establish the minimum contents to be included in the Internal Regulations, Contracts and General Regulations 
of the mutual and investment funds, as well as other informational requirements, in accordance with the provisions 
of Law 20,712.
SUPERSEDES CIRCULAR 2027 AND DEROGATES CIRCULARS 
1538, 1754, 1841, 1947 and 2032, AS WELL AS OFFICIAL 
CIRCULARS 19, 417, AND 704.
09-May-2014
Central 
Bank
AMENDMENT TO CHAPTER III.B.2 OF THE COMPENDIUM OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANK
To incorporate international consensus and current developments on the regulation of liquidity risk, especially 
the lessons of the last international financial crisis, taking into account the Basel III recommendations, and to 
incorporate the lessons from the application of the regulation in Chile since the last modification, in October 2003.
22-May-2014 Central 
Bank
AMENDMENT TO CHAPTER III.J.3 OF THE COMPENDIUM OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATIONS OF THE CENTRAL BANK
To remove regulatory requirements that could be inhibiting the development of prepaid means of payment (stored 
value cards).39
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FIGURE V.1. 
Fraction of derivatives processed through CCPs in FSB 
member countries, by underlying asset class
(percent)
Source: Central Bank of Chile, based on FSB data.
FIGURE V.2. 
Fraction of credit derivatives processed through 
CCPs in the United States
(percent)
Source: Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), through 
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).
6/ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/108622.pdf.
for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) defined by CPSS-IOSCO. The final 
version of the PFMI was published in April 2012, and it replaces the three sets 
of prior independent standards for systemically important payment systems, 
central  counterparties  (CCPs)  and  securities  clearing  systems. The  new  set 
standardizes and strengthens the previous principles and incorporates some 
new guidelines. 
Today, a large number of jurisdictions are in the process of incorporating 
these new principles. According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB), in the 
member countries there are several operational CCPs for derivatives based 
on underlying assets6/. The FSB has also reported that a significant fraction of 
OTC rate and credit derivatives are being channeled through CCPs, and this 
mechanism increased substantially in 2013 (figure V.1). Since 2013, the United 
States has been working to apply the mandate to centralize certain classes 
of standardized OTC derivatives. In its annual report issued in May 2014, the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) indicates that in the United States, 
credit derivatives processed in CCPs have increased from 0% in 2009 to 81% 
in February 2014 (figure V.2).
Main lessons from the seminar “OTC Derivatives Global Reform” 
organized jointly by the Central Bank of Chile and the IMF
The actions to be taken to comply with the aforementioned G20 agreements, 
with regard to cross-border OTC derivative transactions, can be grouped under 
four general guidelines:
(i) Recognition of local CCPs by foreign jurisdictions, in particular the United 
States and the European Union, which implies first demonstrating that, in terms 
of derivatives, the local legislation and supervision are equivalent to those 
jurisdictions.
(ii) Alternatively or as a complement, there would need to be local recognition 
of foreign CCPs that process transactions involving a local counterparty.
(iii) Compliance with the PFMI, at least in relation to derivatives infrastructure. 
Here, most jurisdictions would have to implement legal and regulatory changes 
in order to adapt to the principles.
(iv) Explicit coordination agreements between authorities, at both the local and 
international levels.
From the perspective of local authorities, the implications of the international 
initiatives can be divided into two groups. First, there are those actions or 
reforms that are not strictly necessary in the short term, but that are related to 
compliance with international recommendations, such as the implementation 
of the PFMI and compliance with the G20 criteria. While not adapting to this 40
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7/ http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm.
8/ For more details on this Directive, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-690_en.htm.
9/ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-244_en.htm.
structure would not affect the functioning of local markets, conforming to 
these standards could influence, for example, the international collateral and 
capital requirements for local banks in their cross-border transactions. It could 
also affect Chile’s potential financial integration with the world in the medium 
and long term. Second, there are those actions that are necessary for Chilean 
agents  who  participate  in  cross-border  transactions  to  continue  operating 
normally with their foreign counterparties. Even if Chile does not accede to 
the PFMI or the G20 standards, the foreign counterparties of local agents are 
subject to their respective regulatory frameworks, that is, they are obligated 
to report the transaction to a trade repository (TR) and/or process it through 
a CCP. With regard to transaction reports to a foreign TR, it is important to 
study the necessity and advisability of international agreements on reciprocal 
access to information, taking into account the local rules on access to financial 
information. With regard to transactions processed through a foreign CCP, 
it is necessary to determine the criteria under which the foreign CCPs are 
recognized, the conditions under which local agents are allowed to participate 
in these services and the nature of the obligations contracted by the local 
entities with these counterparties.
Advances on the European Banking Union
As a reaction to the international financial crisis, the authorities in the European 
Union (EU) committed to developing a Banking Union. The declared objectives 
include ensuring that taxpayers do not face losses from future crises and 
breaking the link between bank’s and sovereign’s finances. In June 2009, the 
European Council recommended establishing a single set of rules applicable 
to all financial institutions in the common market7/. Conceptually, the Banking 
Union is based on four basic elements: a uniform deposit insurance scheme, 
common prudential requirements, a single bank supervisor and a single bank 
resolution mechanism. 
Since  the  initial  recommendation  in  2009,  the  European  authorities  have 
progressively moved forward with the implementation of the Banking Union. 
In July 2010, the Commission proposed substantive changes to the deposit 
insurance scheme, in order to simplify, adapt and standardize these protection 
mechanisms8/;  in  July  2013,  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive  (CRD  IV) 
entered into force, which will implement Basel III9/; and in October 2013, a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism was adopted, which should be fully operational 
in November 2014. Finally, substantial progress was made on the resolution 
of  banks  with  solvency  problems  in  early  2014:  in  March,  the  European 
Parliament and the European Council reached a political agreement to support 
the European Commission’s proposal for a Single Resolution Mechanism, while 
in April, the Parliament adopted the bank resolution and deposit insurance 
directives. These events are important milestones in the reform process 
associated with the Banking Union, as they represent the consolidation of the 
fundamental policy guidelines for the new scheme. 41
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With the deposit guarantee schemes (DGS) proposed by the Commission in 
2010 and recently adopted by the Parliament, the authorities have advanced 
toward a more uniform deposit insurance scheme across the EU and agreed 
to maintain the state deposit guarantee with coverage of 100,000 euros. The 
agreement further contemplates streamlining the process of accessing the 
funds, through a calendar for gradually reducing the reimbursement time from 
the current 20 business days to only seven.
The new prudential requirements for the European banking system, established 
through the CRD IV, will implement Basel III in Europe and incorporate elements 
that go beyond the solvency and liquidity scheme. These include requirements 
for strengthening the banks’ corporate governance, especially in terms of risk 
monitoring by the board of directors; reporting requirements to improve the 
transparency of the banking industry; and requirements for banks to reduce the 
use of risk rating agencies. 
In the framework of the new Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for the 
Eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) will be responsible for the direct 
supervision of banks deemed “significant,” namely, if the value of the bank’s 
assets exceeds 30 billion euros or represents at least 20% of the GDP of their 
country of origin. Banks that have received fiscal support or European bailout 
funds will also be directly supervised by the ECB. This covers about 130 banks, 
which represent 85% of total European bank assets. On 16 April, the ECB 
published the regulations establishing the general framework for cooperation 
with national bank supervisory authorities, who will support the ECB in its new 
supervisory role and also perform the direct supervision and monitoring of the 
remaining banks.
The  Bank  Recovery  and  Resolution  Directive  (BRRD),  which  is  still  under 
discussion, will constitute a single set of rules for the recovery and resolution of 
banks in the EU and provide tools for prevention, intervention and resolution. 
Consequently, the BRRD will require banks to design recovery plans—so-called 
living wills—outlining the necessary measures for overcoming stress events; 
while the authorities must develop resolution plans for banks with critical 
problems, at both the group and individual levels. These measures aim to 
preserve the most crucial functions and services for the proper functioning of 
the financial system as a whole. The main resolution tools considered are the 
winding down of specific business areas, the incorporation of bridge banks, 
asset separation and a “bail-in” mechanism to ensure that the first agents to 
face losses would be the shareholders and creditors of the bank in question, 
thereby upholding deposit protection and reducing the possibility of falling 
back on fiscal funds.42
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TABLE V.3
List of documents reviewed
Document Title Organization Solvency / 
Liquidity
Infrastructure / 
Transparency
SIFIs Risk mngmt / 
Governance
Supervision
1/ FSB member jurisdictions' action plans to reduce reliance on CRA ratings FSB *
2/ Thematic Review of the FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (final report) FSB *
3/ Seventh Progress Report on OTC derivatives reform implementation FSB *
4/
Consultative Document: Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Non-Bank Non-Insurer 
Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions
FSB *
5/
Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture (A 
Framework for Assessing Risk Culture)
FSB *
6/ Supervisory Intensity and Effectiveness (Progress Report on Enhanced Supervision) FSB * * *
7/ Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements BIS * *
8/ Liquidity coverage ratio disclosure standards BIS * *
11/ Capital requirements for bank exposures to central counterparties: final standard BIS *
12/ Supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures: final standard BIS * *
13/ Guidance for Supervisors on Market-Based Indicators of Liquidity BIS * *
14/ Revised good practice principles for supervisory colleges: consultative document BIS *
15/ A sound capital planning process: fundamental elements BIS * *
16/ External audits of banks: final document BIS * * *
Source: Websites of each institution.
The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) will be the tool for implementing the 
BRRD. The SRM will centralize decision-making on the resolution of a given 
bank, with participation by the ECB and national authorities. The European 
Commission and Council will assume the role of overseeing the process. The 
SRM anticipates the creation of a single resolution fund with contributions from 
banks, which would reach 55 billion euros in eight years. 
Table V.3  lists  the  main  documents  published  on  regulatory  issues  at  the 
international level, with a focus on risk management and corporate governance. 43
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BOX V.I STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL III LIQUIDITY 
REQUIREMENTS
1/ Basel III classifies HQLA in two levels. Level 1 assets can be included in the stock with 
no limits and, in principle, are not subject to haircuts. Level 2 (A and B) require haircuts 
and have a cap of 40% of the HQLA stock. Level 2B assets are relatively lower quality, 
so they require larger haircuts and have a cap of 15%.
2/ Insufficiency is measured relative to 100% compliance. The text of the regulations 
also establishes principles for the supervision and monitoring of the use of these 
alternative mechanisms.
In response to the international financial crisis of 2008, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) revised its 
paper on “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision” (BCBS, 2000 and 2008) and, for the first time, 
proposed  quantitative  standards  for  these  principles  (BCBS, 
2010).
First, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) is designed to ensure that 
a given bank has sufficient high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) 
to survive a 30-day liquidity stress scenario. Second, the net 
stable funding ratio (NSFR) complements the LCR by ensuring 
an asset and liability maturity profile that is sustainable over 
a period of one year. These indicators will enter into effect in 
2015 and 2018, respectively, with a phase-in period according 
to a schedule proposed by the BCBS, during which banks are 
expected to achieve 100% compliance.
The first formal definition of these indicators was introduced in 
2010 (BCBS, 2010) and compliance by banks in G20 countries is 
now being monitored.
Revisions
The Basel III liquidity indicators have not been exempt from 
criticism. In particular, a debate has arisen around the definition 
of  HQLA  and  the  impact  it  could  have  on  the  demand  for 
sovereign securities and central bank liquidity, as well as the 
implementation  of  monetary  policy. There  are  also  questions 
on the calibration of the standardized weights for the different 
flows and their compatibility with the two indicators; the impact 
on bank financing costs and credit; and the interaction between 
the liquidity rules and other regulations, such as solvency. 
Part of this discussion has been addressed in successive revisions 
by the BCBS. The LCR standards were revised in January 2013 
(BCBS, 2013), adding a new class of HQLA (level 2B1/) and 
changing the discount rates on the different flows considered. 
While the implementation date was held at 1 January 2015, 
the regulatory minimum was reduced to 60%, increasing 10 
percentage points a year until achieving 100% on 1 January 
2019.
This revision also considered the inclusion of three alternative 
mechanisms for jurisdictions that have an insufficient supply of 
HQLA2/:
(i) Liquidity facilities that are contractually committed by the 
central bank, at a cost that does not generate disincentives for 
the direct holding of HQLA.
(ii) The accounting of HQLA in foreign currency to cover liquidity 
risk in local currency, with currency haircuts.
(iii) The use of a higher share of level 2A assets, with a higher 
discount rate for the fraction over the 40% limit.
The inclusion of alternative mechanisms came as a response to 
concerns from countries like Australia, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
whose quantitative impact studies identified a limited supply of 
sovereign securities to comply with the requirements of level 1 
HQLA or nonbank corporate debt that qualifies as level 2.
The  NSFR  standards  were  revised  and  put  into  public 
consultation  in  January  2014  (BCBS,  2014a).  This  revision 
recognizes a larger share of stable short-term retail financing 
in the numerator, differentiates liquidity needs by loan portfolio 44
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
3/  For  more  details,  see  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/
bcreg/20131024a.htm.
4/ The local liquidity risk indicator is defined as liquid assets adjusted for market and 
currency risk over net liquidity requirements. See chapter VI of the Circular Básica 
Contable y Financiera issued by the Financial Superintendence of Colombia.
5/ LCR= [HQLA + min {income, 75% disbursements}]/disbursements. It is measured 
independently in local and foreign currency. See Resolution S.B.S. 9075 – 2012.
6/ That is, banks with an asset share of over 1% of total financial system assets.
7/ Resolution 4090 of 24 May 2012, Central Bank of Brazil.
quality in the denominator and improves the consistency with 
the revised LCR weights. The BCBS set the implementation date 
for 1 January 2018, although it has not yet announced the 
required introductory level or the phase-in period. 
International experience
The European Union must issue the final regulations on LCR 
compliance by mid-2014 (BCBS, 2014b). To date, the Capital 
Requirements  Directive  (CRD  IV)  incorporates  an  obligatory 
60% compliance with the LCR starting on 1 January 2015, with 
annual increases until achieving 100% in 2018, one year earlier 
than  suggested  by  Basel  III. The  regulations  will  be  applied 
to all banks and nonbank financial institutions deemed to be 
systemically important.
In October 2013, the U.S. Federal Reserve published for public 
consultation an LCR proposal for large banking conglomerates, 
with differentiated requirements depending on size. The final 
regulations should be published in 2014, and the indicator will 
enter into effect at 80% in January 2015, with a phase-in period 
of just two years3/.
The emerging economies are also making progresses:
• In China, in February 2014, the Banking Regulatory Commission 
published regulatory guidelines on liquidity risk management 
in the commercial banking system, including the LCR with the 
same phase-in period set by the BCBS. These regulations entered 
into force in March of this year (BCBS, 2014b). 
•  South  Africa  introduced  regulations  that  incorporate  the 
monitoring of the LCR in early 2013, with a view to achieving 
final  adoption  within  the  schedule  set  by  the  BCBS  (BCBS, 
2014b). 
• In Latin America, Colombia issued regulations on liquidity risk 
management in 2011, to adapt the local liquidity risk indicator 
to LCR standards. These regulations, which entered into effect in 
20124/, apply not only to banks, but also more generally to credit 
establishments, large cooperatives and stock brokers. 
• In Peru, the “Regulations for Liquidity Risk Management” 
were issued in 2012, introducing a liquidity requirement that 
is similar to the LCR5/. The regulations implement an initial limit 
of 80% starting in January 2014 and increasing to 100% in 
January 2016, but only for banks that have a strong share of 
retail financing or that could represent systemic risk6/
•  Brazil  has  had  a  regulatory  framework  for  liquidity  risk 
management  in  line  with  BIS  principles  since  20127/.  Draft 
regulations introducing the LCR are expected to be published in 
the second quarter of 2014 (BCBS, 2014b).
Advances in Chile
In early May of this year, the Central Bank of Chile put to public 
consultation a set of regulatory guidelines that aim to align the 
local regulations with international qualitative and quantitative 
standards (chapter V). The implementation of these regulations 
would mark the start of the observation period for the Basel III 
liquidity indicators in the Chilean banking system, during which 
the Bank will undertake the evaluation and solution of undesired 
consequences  and  make  the  necessary  adjustments  prior  to 
incorporating regulatory limits. Preliminary estimates by the IMF, 
the Central Bank and the SBIF indicate that the banking sector is 
well positioned to comply with these indicators at the system level, 
although there are differences among individual institutions (IMF, 
2013b; Central Bank of Chile, 2010).
The  LCR  proposed  in  the  draft  regulations  put  to  public 
consultation  is  a  strict  version  of  Basel  III,  adjusted  to  the 
realities of the local market, which ensures its credibility and 
comparability at the international level. During the observation 
period, an assessment will be made of existing gaps between 
the supply and demand of HQLA, which could translate into 
difficulties  in  achieving  100%  compliance.  Based  on  this 
assessment, the Bank will revise the proposed criteria, evaluate 
the necessity and advisability of establishing alternative liquidity 
mechanisms and define an appropriate period for the progressive 
introduction of the requirement, with levels and schedules that 
might be different from those established by the BCBS. This fine-
tuning  process  will  maintain  the  general  framework  defined 
by the international standards and aim to produce the least 
possible impact on the stability of the financial system.45
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GLOSSARY
Acid liquidity: The acid-test ratio, or the ratio between current assets net of 
inventory and current liabilities.
Average interbank interest rate swap (promedio cámara): Derivatives 
contract between two parties, who carry out an exchange of flows at future dates, 
between a fixed rate established when the contract is written and a variable rate 
(fixed-for-floating swap). The variable rate corresponds to the average interest 
rate in the interbank clearing house (cámara), which in turn is derived from the 
average clearing house index.
Basel III: A set of new capital and liquidity requirements for the banking 
industry, developed by the BIS with the aim of substantially strengthening the 
Basel II capital framework. The objectives include the following: raise the quality, 
consistency and transparency of the capital base; strengthen risk hedging; 
introduce leverage limits; promote a countercyclical capital framework; and 
introduce a global liquidity standard. These requirements will be implemented 
gradually through 2019.
CAR: Capital adequacy ratio. A measure of a bank’s financial soundness, 
measured as the ratio of capital to credit-risk-weighted assets.
Central counterparty: An intermediary that acts as the buyer for all sellers 
and as the seller for all buyers in a given market.
Certificate of deposit: A certificate issued by a bank, in recognition of having 
received a deposit for a specified period and at a specified interest rate. Essentially, 
it is a type of negotiable fixed-term deposit (documented by the certificate).
Conventional maximum interest rate: The upper limit on lending interest 
rates, which is 50% over the current interest rate. It is set by the SBIF, and 
exceeding this limit is sanctioned by Law 18,010.
Core capital: Paid-in capital plus bank reserves and period earnings, net of 
provisions for the distribution of dividends.
Countercyclical provisions: Bank provisions constituted when the 
macroeconomic scenario is favorable and released when the environment 
deteriorates, thereby promoting a more stable evolution of provisions across 
the cycle.
Credit risk: The possibility that a bank borrower or counterparty will fail to 
meet its contractual obligation, whether in interest or capital.
Currency mismatch: The difference between foreign currency liabilities and 
foreign currency assets, less the net position in derivatives (the difference 
between buy and sell positions in derivatives contracts). An alternative measure 
is calculated as the difference between external debt and the net derivatives 
position, scaled by exports minus imports.48
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
Currency risk: Exposure to losses caused by adverse changes in the value of 
the foreign currencies in which the instruments, contracts and other transactions 
recorded on the balance sheet are denominated.
Default of 90 days or more: The total amount of a loan that is past due 
by 90 days or longer, even if only some of the monthly payments are past due.
Delinquent loans: Loans that are past due by more than 30 days from the 
maturity date. The full amount of the loan is considered delinquent.
Deposit insurance: Bank funds—common to a given financial system—that 
back retail deposits (usually from private individuals).
DTI: Debt-to-income ratio. Measures the debt held by households with different 
financial and nonfinancial entities as a percentage of their disposable income. 
Effective equity: The sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. The latter mainly includes 
subordinated bonds and additional provisions. 
Financial debt: Debt that pays interest, measured as bank debt, plus public 
liabilities (bonds and commercial papers).
Financial indebtedness: Ratio of financial indebtedness, measured as financial 
debt/(Equity plus minority interest).
FIR: Financial burden-to-income ratio. Measures the payments that households 
must make to fulfill their consumer and mortgage loan commitments, as a 
percentage of their disposable income.
Indexation margin: Difference between the indexation adjustments earned 
and paid by banks, measured relative to total bank assets.
Interest coverage ratio: A measure of repayment capacity, defined as the 
ratio of EBITDA to financial expense.
Interest margin: Difference between the interest earned and paid by banks, 
measured relative to total bank assets.
Interest rate risk: Exposure to losses caused by adverse changes in interest 
rates, which affect the value of the instruments, contracts and other transactions 
recorded on the balance sheet.
Leverage: Measured as the banks’ debt over equity; used as a complementary 
tool to capital adequacy requirements. 
Liquidity coverage ratio (LCR): A measure designed to ensure that a bank has 
sufficient high-quality liquid assets to survive a 30-day liquidity stress scenario. 
Defined as the ratio of high-quality liquid assets to total net cash outflows for 
the 30-day stress scenario. 
Liquidity risk: The risk that a counterparty (or participant in the payments 
system) will not be able to meet its obligations when they come due, although 
it may be able to do so in the future. Liquidity risk does not necessarily imply 
that the counterparty is insolvent. 
Market risk exposure (MRE): Exposure to interest rate risk on the trading 
book and to currency risk on the balance sheet. 
Market risk: The potential loss in value of the net positions held by a financial 
entity, as the result of adverse changes in market prices. 49
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT  FIRST HALF 2014
Net interest margin: Difference between interests and indexation adjustments 
earned and paid by banks, measured relative to total bank assets.
Net stable funding ratio (NSFR): A measure designed to complement the 
LCR by ensuring an asset and liability profile that is sustainable in the long term 
(one year). Defined as the ratio of the amount of available stable funding to 
the amount of required stable funding, equal to the weighted sum of liabilities 
and assets, respectively. 
Nonperforming loans: Bank loans, or a fraction thereof, that are past due by 
up to 90 days from the maturity date. On loans with fixed monthly payments, only 
the amount of the past-due payment is considered, although the full amount of 
the loan could transferred to the nonperforming portfolio if acceleration clauses 
are enforced.
NPL ratio: Nonperforming loans ratio. A measure of credit risk, measured as 
the ratio between nonperforming loans and total loans. 
Operating income: A bank’s earnings, including the interest margin, indexation 
margin, commissions, foreign exchange operations, financial operations, recovery 
of write-offs and other operating income.
Prime-swap spread: The difference between the prime deposit rate and the 
average interbank swap rate. Like equivalent measures in other markets (such as 
the LIBOR-OIS spread), it is used as a benchmark for analyzing funding liquidity 
conditions in the banking sector.
Provisions coverage ratio: Measure of a bank’s provisions relative to 
nonperforming loans. 
Repricing: A component of interest rate risk, corresponding to the exposure 
to losses caused by rolling over of assets and liabilities with different maturities 
under different financial conditions.
Residual short-term external debt: External debt coming due within 12 
months of a given date (that is, short-term external debt plus the current portion 
of long-term external debt).
Revolving credit: Under this loan facility, which is generally associated with 
lines of credit and credit cards, a borrower can repay less than the total amount 
borrowed in the “minimum payment” period. The balance generates a new debt 
(revolving loan), to which the effective interest rate for the period is applied and 
added to the loan balance.
Risk-weighted assets: Bank assets weighted on the basis of five risk categories, 
set forth in Article 67 of the General Banking Law. The ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets serves as a measure of capital adequacy (known as the Basel 
ratio), which is internationally accepted as a measure of bank solvency.
ROA: Return on assets. Measured as the ratio of earnings after taxes, 
amortizations and extraordinary items to total assets.
ROE: Return on equity. Measured as the ratio of earnings after taxes, 
amortizations and extraordinary items to shareholders’ equity plus minority 
interest. It is the shareholders’ return.
Senior bonds: Ordinary long-term bonds issued by banks.
Sovereign spread: The difference between the interest rate on a U.S. Treasury 
bond and the interest rate on debt instruments issued in local or foreign currency 
by the government of a given country. 50
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Subordinate bonds: Long-term bonds issued by banks, with an average 
maturity of not less than five years and with no prepayment clauses. Because 
subordinate bonds are repaid after the claims of other creditors are settled in the 
case of bank liquidation, a share of these bonds is computed as effective equity.
Syndicated loans: Financing provided by a group of banks or financial 
institutions, under a single loan contract, with the goal of diversifying the risks 
associated with a very large loan.
Tier 1: Core capital plus declared reserves or retained earnings. May also include 
non-redeemable non-cumulative preferred stock.
Tier 2 capital: Also called supplementary capital. Bank equity exceeding 
Tier 1 capital. Includes subordinated bonds, up to 50% of Tier 1 capital, and 
general provisions up to 1.25% of risk-weighted assets. 
Unpaid installments ratio: A measure of credit risk calculated as the ratio 
of loan installments that are past due by over 90 days to the total debt. For 
business loans, the delinquent installments are past due by up to three years; 
for personal loans, up to one year. 51
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ABBREVIATIONS
Achef: Asociación Chilena de Empresas de Factoring (Association of Chilean 
Factoring Firms).
ECB: European Central Bank.
BCS: Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago (Santiago Stock Exchange).
BCU: Central Bank bonds denominated in UFs. 
BIS: Bank for International Settlements.
CSD: Central Securities Depository. 
FTD: Fixed-term deposit.
RSTED: Residual short-term external debt.
BLS: Bank Lending Survey. 
EMBI: Emerging Market Bond Index. 
FFR: Federal funds rate (U.S. Federal Reserve policy rate) 
FSI: Financial soundness indicators.
PF: Pension funds.
PRF: Pension Reserve Fund. GDN: Global Depositary Notes. 
FDI: Foreign direct investment.
FSR: Financial Stability Report.
IPoM: Monetary Policy Report.
GBL: General Banking Law.
MSCI: Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
NIIP: Net international investment position.
SBIF: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (Superintendence 
of Banks and Financial Institutions).
SII: Servicio de Impuestos Internos (Chilean Internal Revenue Service).
SP: Superintendencia de Pensiones (Superintendence of Pensions).
SuSeSo: Superintendencia de Seguridad Social (Superintendence of Social 
Security).
SVS: Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (Superintendence of Securities 
and Insurance).
UF: an inflation-indexed unit of account. 
VIX: Volatility Index.Alejandro Zurbuchen S.
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